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Abstract 
∎ Rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of 
international relations over the past two years. It shapes both strategic 
debates and real political, military and economic dynamics. 
∎ The dimensions of Sino-American competition over power and status in-
clude growing threat perceptions and an increasingly important political/ 
ideological component. 
∎ The US-China trade conflict is politically instrumental and closely bound 
up with the development of the world order. 
∎ The crux of the technological dimension is not who sets the standards, 
but geopolitical power projection through “technopolitical spheres of 
influence”. The development and use of technologies thus become part 
of a systemic competition. 
∎ Through their respective leadership styles, Presidents Trump and Xi 
foment bilateral conflicts and – each in their own way – damage inter-
national rules and institutions. 
∎ The Sino-American rivalry also undermines multilateral institutions such 
as the World Trade Organisation. While Washington has withdrawn from 
a number of multilateral institutions, Beijing is expanding its influence in 
contexts like the United Nations. 
∎ Europe needs to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between 
the American and Chinese economic/technological spheres. The European 
Union must develop a China policy for its drive towards sovereignty (stra-
tegic autonomy). That requires a “supranational geopolitics”. 
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Rivalry between the United States and China has 
become a paradigm of international relations over 
the past two years. It shapes strategic debates and 
real political, military and economic dynamics, and 
is likely to continue to do so for some time. That is 
not to say that the competition between Washington 
and Beijing, or even great power rivalry in general, 
determine all other international problems and con-
flicts. But the rivalry does increasingly frequently 
form the lens through which other actors view im-
portant developments and events. At least for the 
United States, it can be said that strategic rivalry with 
China has edged out the “War on Terror” paradigm 
that had prevailed since 2001. 
All contributions to this publication were written 
before the Corona crisis began. Like any global crisis, 
the pandemic will leave an impact on patterns of 
international governance and cooperation, and prob-
ably on the structures of the international system. 
It is possible – but by no means certain – that the 
aftermath of the crisis may actually see global gov-
ernance structures strengthened in individual policy 
realms, particularly with regard to global health. This 
cannot happen without the buy-in of most, if not all, 
the major powers. But even with heightened co-opera-
tion in some policy fields, the rivalry between the 
United States and China will likely remain a – if not 
the – defining issue in international relations for 
some time to come. In some areas, the pandemic may 
actually fuel the competition. This is already seen in 
the ideological realm where China, after first being 
criticised for the way it handled the virus outbreak, 
now highlights the advantages of its own – authori-
tarian – governance system in responding to such 
crises. The pandemic may also witness some nations 
gaining soft power by showing solidarity, while 
others lose some of theirs for not doing so. 
Since 2017 China has been treated as a “long-term 
strategic competitor” in official US government strat-
egy documents. And in its London Declaration of 
December 2019 NATO spoke for the first time of the 
challenges (and opportunities) presented by China’s 
influence and international policies.1 China’s political 
elite is – rightly – convinced that the United States 
is seeking at the very least to prevent any further 
expansion of Chinese influence. And while disputes 
over trade policy and trade balances feature most 
prominently in the US President’s statements and 
directly affect the global economy, they in fact rep-
resent but one aspect of the rivalry and by no means 
the most important. The conflict is, as Peter Rudolf 
shows, multidimensional. 
Analytical clarity is an absolute prerequisite if 
Germany and the European Union are to pursue 
their own autonomous strategic approach to the Sino-
American rivalry: Only if we understand the multi-
dimensionality of the conflict constellation will we be 
able to find appropriate political answers and develop 
the necessary instruments. 
Global Power Rivalry 
The issue at hand is global power equilibria and their 
status within the international system. There are 
grounds to believe that US President Donald Trump 
regards superiority – and above all military domi-
nance – as an end in itself rather than simply a 
means to promote particular interests and values. 
President Xi Jinping appears to be driven more by a 
Chinese vision of world order in which superiority 
is both means and end. But the conflict also has secu-
rity-related, economic, technological and ideological 
 
1 “London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in London 3–4 December 2019”, press 
release 115, 4 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm (accessed 9 December 
2019). 
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dimensions, as well as what one could call a person-
ality dimension. The contributions in this volume 
examine each of these dimensions and their contexts, 
as well as the repercussions of US-China rivalry on 
international institutions and on Europe. The issues 
of relevance also encompass the respective influence 
of the established and the rising superpower on other 
states, regions and societies. 
From the Chinese perspective, as Hanns Günther 
Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker show, the United States 
will never voluntarily cede significant international 
influence to China. America regards China as a revi-
sionist power whose long-term aim is global supremacy. 
This, as the contribution by Marco Overhaus, Peter 
Rudolf and Laura von Daniels demonstrates, is a 
matter of broad consensus in the United States, across 
both main parties and throughout business, politics 
and society as a whole. More considered positions do 
exist, but they tend to be marginalised. Real debate 
is confined largely to the question of the means by 
which the conflict is to be conducted. 
For that reason too, hard security challenges esca-
late, leading to the emergence of a classical security 
dilemma. As Michael Paul and Marco Overhaus out-
line, this applies especially strongly to China as a 
great power that is expanding its radius of action 
and in the process transitioning incrementally from 
the doctrine of coastal defence to maritime “active 
defence”. But it also applies to the United States, which 
sees China’s growing military capabilities as a threat 
not only to its own military bases in the Pacific, but 
also to its system of partnerships and alliances in the 
Asia-Pacific region – and in the longer term to its 
nuclear deterrent. 
Conflicts over Trade, Economic and 
Financial Policy 
Economic competition and conflicts over trade, eco-
nomic and financial policy form a real dimension 
of rivalry in their own right, which predates the pro-
tectionist course adopted by the United States under 
President Trump. Washington’s criticisms of Chinese 
trading practices, unfair competition and rule vio-
lations are widely shared in Europe. The trade conflict 
is, as both Hilpert and von Daniels explicate in their 
contributions, closely bound up with questions of 
world order that are of vital importance, especially 
from the European perspective. That applies for exam-
ple to the future of binding multilateral trade rules 
and institutions. These issues are also of domestic 
political relevance in both states, with strong mobi-
lising potential that is not fully contingent on the 
extent to which global developments actually affect 
the employment situation in particular sectors. All 
in all, however, Hilpert argues, the material benefits 
accruing to both sides from their economic coopera-
tion have declined in comparison to the period 
between 1990 and 2015. Bilateral trade between the 
United States and China is no longer a stabilising 
factor capable of ameliorating political conflicts. 
Instead trade conflicts are politically instrumental-
ised, although they may also represent the most easily 
untangleable knots in the complex web of US-China 
rivalry. Or put another way: the strategic rivalry be-
tween the United States and China will continue to 
exert decisive influence on international politics for 
the foreseeable future, even if Washington and Bei-
jing succeed in resolving important trade issues and 
manage to conclude a trade agreement before the 
upcoming US presidential elections. 
Technological Dimension 
The technological dimension of the rivalry runs 
deeper and will outlast any putative resolution of 
the trade disputes. Both absolute and relative prizes 
are at stake: the question of who will secure the 
largest piece of the cake in the long term, for example 
by defining the technical standards. And technologi-
cal competition is always also a question of security. 
There is no other plausible explanation for the sharp-
ening of competition and the growing mistrust that 
has in the meantime noticeable restricted exchange 
and cooperation in the technological sphere. As 
Matthias Schulze and Daniel Voelsen explain, this 
competition also connects with geopolitical questions 
in the traditional sense: “Technopolitical spheres of 
influence” built on digital products and services are 
no longer purely territorial, but still allow geopoliti-
cal power to be projected and international depend-
encies to be cemented. 
In this connection, questions of the development 
and use of technologies increasingly connect with 
political and ideological aspects. They become part 
of a system opposition or systemic competition con-
cerning the internal order: the relationship between 
state and society, between government and governed. 
Hilpert addresses this political/ideological dimension, 
which located in a global competition between liberal 
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and democratic paradigms on the one side and 
authoritarian on the other. Everywhere, including 
Europe, this might ostensibly be an internal debate, 
but it is codetermined by the polarisation between 
the United States and China. Defending democratic 
values and liberal elements in the world order is 
plainly not a priority for the serving US President. But 
for Congress both these concerns are front and centre 
in the Sino-American rivalry and both chambers have 
been working to promote more decisive policies in this 
respect – most recently with the Hong Kong Human 
Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019. 
The debate in the United States is characterised by 
fear of the rise of China and the possibility of being 
overtaken. This is perhaps why, as Hilpert outlines, 
the Chinese elites also still feel insecure, threatened 
by liberal values and world views. That remains 
the case despite China having disproven the West’s 
liberal expectation that democracy and rule of law 
would emerge more or less automatically if the coun-
try developed economically and generated growing 
prosperity. China’s development model has been 
successful, and liberal values still remain attractive 
especially to young, well-educated and mobile mem-
bers of Chinese society. This explains the Chinese 
leadership’s nervousness over Hong Kong, its appar-
ently exaggerated fear of colour revolutions, and its 
comprehensive efforts to secure its grip on power and 
ideally establish its own type of harmonious society 
by technological means. 
Technologies are, as Schulze and Voelsen point 
out, not value-neutral. The more technological devel-
opments touch on fundamental questions of political 
and social order, the more technological competition 
will be tied to the political/ideological dimension of 
strategic rivalry, be it in data gathering and process-
ing, artificial intelligence or biotechnology. Germany 
and the European Union will also have to address 
questions such as what it would mean for the Euro-
pean model of state and society, which is committed 
to the protection of individual rights, if Chinese 
technology investments were to enable a large-scale 
outflow of personal data. There is also a need for a 
critical investigation of how the development and 
export of surveillance technologies and social control 
techniques by Chinese high-tech firms not only assists 
authoritarian and repressive regimes but also pro-
motes the dissemination of illiberal concepts of gov-
ernance and society. 
Different Leadership Styles 
One can debate the extent to which the personal 
factor, the specific traits of Trump and Xi, represents 
a separate dimension of the US-China rivalry in its 
own right. In any case, Günther Maihold argues, 
their different but in both cases very personal styles 
of leadership will continue to influence relations 
between the United States and China. Trump’s trans-
actional and Xi’s externally and internally transfor-
mative style are highly incompatible. They tend 
to undermine whatever basis of trust still remains, 
restrict the possibilities of diplomacy and exacerbate 
bilateral conflicts. Other powers, including the Euro-
pean Union, might in certain cases gain room for ma-
noeuvre of their own. But they will principally have 
to put their efforts towards upholding international 
rules and international institutions, which are being 
harmed in different ways by both Washington and 
Beijing. 
International Effects 
Even if the constellation of conflict and competition 
described here is understood as a bilateral rivalry and 
to some extent plays out as such, its significance and 
consequences are global: It affects relationships with 
other powers, influences regional dynamics even 
in Europe, shapes the work of international organi-
sations and forums (such as the G20 or the United 
Nations and its agencies), and, as Laura von Daniels 
describes, often enough undermines multilateral 
institutions. This is especially clear in the case of the 
World Trade Organisation, whose rules have been 
violated by both sides and whose very function the 
Trump Administration has sought to impair. China 
is establishing new international forums and organi-
sations in line with its own Sinocentric concepts of 
order, especially in its own regional environment. But 
unlike the United States, China is showing no signs 
of withdrawing from international and multilateral 
institutions. Instead it is working actively to expand 
its influence at the United Nations and within its agen-
cies and programmes. One channel by which this 
occurs, not least in the case of UN peacekeeping, is 
for China to assume greater responsibility and a 
larger share of the costs. But at the same time it seeks 
to establish its own political terms and values in the 
language of the United Nations. Whereas Trump took 
the United States out of the UN Human Rights Coun-
Volker Perthes 
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cil, China has been working establish its own ideas 
within it, for example by relativising the importance 
of individual human rights. 
The European Union and its member states are 
affected directly and indirectly by the Sino-American 
rivalry. Europe’s take on China has become more 
critical, in Germany probably more so than in other 
EU member states. Europe no longer sees China just 
a negotiating partner with different interests and an 
economic competitor, but also a “systemic rival pro-
moting alternative models of governance”.2 Never-
theless, from the European perspective China remains 
a vital cooperation partner for tackling global chal-
lenges, first and foremost but not exclusively in con-
nection with climate protection. Europe cannot have 
any interest in a “decoupling”, in the sense of a broad 
severing of technological and economic ties of the 
kind being discussed and to an extent also prepared 
in the United States. Like many other states and 
regional groupings, Europe will also have to resist the 
bipolar logic pressing it to choose between an Ameri-
can and a Chinese economic and technological sphere. 
Instead it will have no alternative but to work 
towards sustainable long-term ties on the basis of real 
interdependency and shared rules. Equidistance to 
China and the United States, as occasionally proposed 
by interested parties in European debates,3 is not an 
option however. For that the gap between Europe and 
China – in terms of questions of values, the political 
system and the rules-based international order – is 
too large. And however great the differences may 
appear, the ties that bind the Euro-American com-
munity of values and security are likely to remain a 
great deal closer than the relationships of either the 
United States or the states of Europe to any other 
international partner. 
 
2 European Commission, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa. 
eu/commission/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-
commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-
2019_de (accessed 4 December 2019). 
3 For example Xuewu Gu, “Der dritte Weg: Warum Europa 
den Alleingang wagen muss”, Handelsblatt, 22 December 
2019, https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/ 
gastkommentar-der-dritte-weg-warum-europa-den-alleingang-
wagen-muss/25253468.html (accessed 4 December 2019). 
New Strategy for Europe 
Europe will, as Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert 
underline, have to discover its own strengths and 
develop a China policy that is not conceived as a 
“country strategy”, but as part of a comprehensive 
European strategy of self-assertion, or, in other words, 
part of a striving for greater European sovereignty 
or strategic autonomy.4 Especially in connection with 
China, this demands more supranationality, or what 
Bendiek and Lippert call a “supranational geopoli-
tics”. Work is already under way on instruments that 
could serve a confident, prudent European policy 
towards China, such as foreign investment screening 
complemented by national legislation. The trick is 
to prepare Europe for harsher competition by streng-
thening social and technological resilience, without 
weakening cooperation and interdependency. Such a 
strategy should apply to not only the direct relation-
ship to China but also to Europe’s international and 
global profile as a whole. Many states and societies in 
Asia and Africa value China’s economic engagement 
and its Belt and Road Initiative, but fear one-sided 
dependencies. Here the European Union’s connectivity 
strategy towards Asia represents a sensible approach. 
The same applies to the already considerable funds 
that Europe provides for African infrastructure, for 
example via the European Investment Bank. Finally, 
European states will have to expand their engage-
ment in the United Nations and other multilateral 
organisations and forums. In the process they may 
find themselves having to fill gaps created by the 
disinterest or withdrawal of the current Administra-
tion in Washington. That offers an opportunity to 
demonstrate that Europe’s understanding of multi-
lateralism and international rules differs fundamen-
tally from Sinocentric multi-bilateralism. 
 
4 For an in-depth treatment, see Barbara Lippert, Nicolai 
von Ondarza and Volker Perthes, eds., European Strategic 
Autonomy: Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interest, SWP Research Paper 
4/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 
2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/european-
strategic-autonomy/. 
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The strategic rivalry between the United States and 
China risks spiralling into a multi-layered world con-
flict that presents economic and military dangers.* 
The rivalry between the two great powers is begin-
ning to structure international relations and bears the 
potential to bring forth a new “geo-economic world 
order”. In comparison to past decades, the question 
of who gains more from economic exchange and con-
cern over the problematic security implications of 
economic interdependence now play a much more 
important role. If economic and security interests are 
placed on a permanently new footing under these 
aspects, the level of integration could decline to a 
point where it could be regarded as a kind of de-
globalisation. 
China’s Rise as Threat to 
American Predominance 
In the United States the rise of China is widely 
regarded as a danger to America’s own dominant 
position in the international system. Although the 
idea of an unstoppable Chinese economic and mili-
tary expansion and a relative loss of power for the 
United States is based on questionable assumptions 
and projections, China is genuinely the only country 
with the potential to threaten the status of the United 
States. Power shifts, it is argued, could endanger the 
stability of the international system, if the predomi-
nant and the rising power prove incapable of reach-
ing an understanding over governance and leadership 
in the international system. This is the implication 
of the power transition theory that has been avidly 
discussed in both countries and in recent years col-
 
* This chapter summarises the findings of a longer study 
by the author, which also includes extensive references 
and sources. Peter Rudolf, The Sino-American World Conflict, 
SWP Research Paper 03/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, February 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
publication/the-sino-american-world-conflict/. 
oured the public debate in the guise of the “Thucydi-
des Trap”. The theory itself is problematic, its explana-
tory value contested. But as an interpretive frame-
work it influences perceptions both in the United 
States and in China. On the one hand this framework 
highlights the risks of a transition, on the other it sees 
individual conflicts of a more regional or local nature 
coalescing to a global hegemonic conflict. 
On the Structure of the Sino-American 
Conflict Syndrome 
A string of elements make up the US-China conflict 
syndrome. Its basis is a regional – and increasingly 
also global – status rivalry. China’s growing power 
has awakened American fears over its status as the 
only international superpower. Some would argue 
that states (or the protagonists representing them) 
seek status as an end in itself, as postulated in ap-
proaches grounded in social psychology. In this 
understanding, higher status engenders the psycho-
logical gratification of superiority over other individ-
uals or states, and the prospect of losing this status 
threatens one’s own identity. But status is also asso-
ciated with material gains. In the longer term, China 
threatens not only America’s status as the leading 
power, but also the privileges and economic advan-
tages that ensue from that status. China could, the 
sceptics argue, acquire dominant global political, 
economic and technological influence, set rules and 
standards across the board, and establish a kind of 
“illiberal sphere of influence”. In this case the United 
States would no longer be able to guarantee the secu-
rity and prosperity it has enjoyed to date. 
This competition for influence melds with an 
ideological antagonism. Of course, the human rights 
situation in China has always been a cause of inter-
mittent friction in US-China relations. But as long as 
China’s rise was not perceived as a global challenge 
and as long as the hope survived that China would 
eventually liberalise, China was not perceived as an 
Peter Rudolf 
The Sino-American World Conflict 
Peter Rudolf 
SWP Berlin 
Strategic Rivalry between United States and China 
April 2020 
10 
ideological antagonist in the United States. From the 
Chinese perspective this ideological dimension has 
always been more salient, given that Western con-
cepts of liberal democracy and freedom of expression 
threaten the ideological dominance of the Chinese 
Communist Party. It must be expected, however, that 
the systemic conflict will loom increasingly large on 
the American side, sometimes interpreted as a clash 
between “liberal democracy” and what is occasionally 
referred to as “digital authoritarianism”. Highlighting 
the ideological conflict might be employed to mobi-
lise sustained domestic support for a power clash 
with China that cannot come free of economic costs. 
Even if the ideological conflict is not the most im-
portant layer, it must certainly be expected that an 
increasingly pointed “ideological difference” will 
intensify threat perceptions and thus strengthen the 
security dilemma between the United States and 
China. Since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96 both sides 
(again) see each other as potential military adversaries 
and align their planning accordingly, so the security 
dilemma shapes the structure of the relationship. 
Neither side is especially sensitive to the reciprocal 
threat perceptions this produces, because the antago-
nists each see themselves as defensive, peaceful 
powers but suspect the respective other of aggressive 
offensive intentions. 
Dimensions and Dynamics of the Rivalry 
Given that China and the United States are potential 
military adversaries – and not merely systemic an-
tagonists competing over status – the relationship 
between the two must be understood as a complex 
strategic rivalry. This is especially clear on China’s 
maritime periphery, where the rivalry is dominated 
by perceptions of military threats and the American 
view that China is seeking to establish an exclusive 
sphere of influence in East Asia. In the South China 
Sea Washington’s insistence on unhindered access 
and freedom of navigation collides with China’s 
efforts to create a security zone and counter Ameri-
ca’s ability to intervene. The geopolitical conflict over 
the South China Sea is, moreover, interwoven with 
the nuclear dimension. China appears to be turning 
the South China Sea into a protected bastion for 
nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-
strike capability vis-à-vis the United States. 
Technological dimension of global 
competition for influence. 
There are also military threat perceptions – albeit 
less important – in the global competition for influ-
ence, which in the meantime also encompasses the 
Arctic. The present US Administration is convinced 
that China’s growing global economic and political 
presence comes at the expense of the United States. In 
response Washington is applying pressure and incen-
tives to dissuade other states from expanding their 
economic relations with China. 
The global competition for influence is intimately 
bound up with the technological dimension of the 
US-China rivalry, which concerns technological pre-
dominance in the digital age. What makes this 
dimension of the conflict so crucial is that technolog-
ical leadership creates global competitive advantage 
and secures the basis for military superiority. 
As reflected in the campaign against Huawei, we 
are witnessing a turn away from the positive-sum 
logic in economic relations with China. As long as 
Washington was not afraid of the rise of a strategic 
rival the economic logic predominated. And in abso-
lute terms the United States profited from economic 
exchange relations. That China may have derived 
relatively larger benefits played no real role. This 
economic logic of absolute gains was tied to an expec-
tation that economic interdependence would have 
cooperation-promoting and peace-stabilising effects. 
Now fears that China is growing into a global strategic 
rival are eclipsing the economic logic. Under Trump 
the security logic now dominates both rhetoric and 
practice, in association with concerns over the rela-
tive distribution of gains and the view that economic 
interdependence has negative consequences for the 
technological basis of military superiority. 
Consequences 
If the strategic rivalry between the United States and 
China consolidates into a lasting global conflict con-
stellation this could set in motion a kind of deglobali-
sation, ultimately leading to two parallel orders, one 
dominated by the United States, the other by China. If 
the US-China conflict continues to sharpen and accel-
erates the bipolarisation of the international system, 
the basis for global multilateralism could disappear. 
And the US-China world conflict confronts Germany 
and the European Union with the question of the 
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extent to which and terms under which they should 
support the United States against China. One thing 
appears certain: Whether President Trump is reelected 
or a Democrat enters the White House in January 
2021, the strategic rivalry with China will shape US 
foreign policy. 
Washington views the world, and 
Europe, through a “China lens”. 
Washington will likely view the world, and Europe, 
above all through a “China lens”. If this leads the 
United States to fixate even more strongly on the Indo-
Pacific and competition over influence with China, it 
may treat crises in Europe and the European periph-
ery as secondary. Washington’s pressure on its allies 
to take a clear position on the sharpening US-China 
conflict and clearly side with the United States is 
likely to grow rather than wane. 
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The power of the United States has always exerted a 
special fascination on China’s political elites, while at 
the same time representing a permanent source of in-
security. In view of this obsessive fixation on America, 
the political scientist Graham Allison struck a nerve 
when he applied the metaphor of “the Thucydides 
Trap” to describe Sino-American relations.1 According 
to Allison’s comparative historical study, the growing 
influence of a rising power automatically leads to 
geopolitical power shifts and adjustment processes, 
and potentially even to armed conflict. He argues that 
the process in Ancient Greece described by Thucydi-
des – where the rise of Athens made war with Sparta 
inevitable – is a real risk today in the relationship 
between China and the United States. Such warnings 
naturally contradict China’s own rhetoric of peaceful 
rise. 
From the Chinese perspective, the 
country’s gain in economic and 
political importance is nothing more 
than a resurgence. 
China sees its own rise as natural and inevitable. 
And on the other side, in Beijing’s view, a frustrated 
America is seeking to preserve its own supremacy by 
containing China geopolitically and hindering its eco-
nomic, technological and military development. The 
Chinese firmly believe that their success story of the 
past four decades rests not on American weakness but 
in the first place on the hard work and ingenuity of 
the Chinese people, the commercial aptitude of its 
businesses, and the intelligent and far-sighted policies 
of the state and party leadership in Beijing. 
One can only speculate about how the United 
States is really perceived in China, because official 
statements and public media representations are 
closely controlled, while academic publications are 
either subject to self-censorship or are intended to 
 
1 Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China 
Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston, 2017). 
convey certain political messages to the other side. 
In the following we therefore describe the America-
related narratives that are identifiable in China’s 
official and published sources. Social media sources 
are included too, along with personal discussions 
with researchers in China. 
China as “Champion of the South” 
From the Chinese perspective, the country’s gain in 
economic and political importance is nothing more 
than a resurgence. Until the late eighteenth century 
China’s per capita income exceeded that of Western 
Europe or North America, and China was the un-
contested leading power in Asia. Only after the arrival 
of Western colonialism and imperialism was China 
plunged into a decline lasting roughly a century, dur-
ing which it suffered economic exploitation, political 
humiliation and military invasion (the “century of 
humiliation”). Chinese views of America and the West 
remain correspondingly ambivalent today. On the 
one hand the United States engenders fascination for 
its capacity to innovate, its economic strength, its 
universities, its military capabilities, and its political 
system; all these earn respect and admiration in 
China. On the other, the negative experiences of the 
past create distance and mistrust towards the West. 
More recently, the global financial crisis, America’s 
military interventions in the Middle East and Trump’s 
erratic style of politics have greatly eroded the West’s 
reputation. 
Despite its economic success and great power status, 
China still sees itself as part of the Global South. To 
this day the political leadership speaks of China as 
the “the world’s largest developing country”. In fact 
the North/South dimension – citing a global develop-
ment and power gap between the West and the rest 
of the world – probably features more prominently 
in the Chinese discourse than the more ideological 
East/West divide: China presents itself as the trail-
blazer and advocate of the emerging economies and 
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developing countries, not as the systemic adversary of 
the United States and the West. From this perspective 
America represents the paradigm for modernisation: 
China needs to reduce the gap with the United States 
and catch up in order to make the world a fairer and 
more just place. This self-assessment also modifies the 
triumphalism that always resonates in Beijing’s recur-
rent narrative of a rising China and declining America. 
America Blocking China’s Progress 
Beijing has always viewed America with deep mis-
trust, suspecting it of seeking to internally corrupt 
and transform China – and the rest of the Com-
munist world – by means of “peaceful evolution”, in 
other words infiltration and subversion from within. 
These fears were confirmed with shocking rapidity 
in 1989, when the Tiananmen massacre was followed 
almost immediately by collapse of the Soviet empire. 
Since then the perception of the United States as an 
obstacle on China’s road to restoring lost greatness 
has been, at least implicitly, a consistent motif in the 
Chinese discourse. 
Fate of Soviet Union warns China to 
avoid open competition with the 
United States. 
The fate of the Soviet Union also left an indelible 
mark on the attitudes of all subsequent generations 
of Chinese leaders. They concluded that open com-
petition with the United States was to be avoided, 
whether in the form of an arms race or through con-
frontation in other fields; real conflict was out of the 
question. Accordingly, they responded to what they 
perceived as America’s attempts at containment with 
the rhetoric of cooperation (“win-win”) and concepts 
such as a “new type of great power relations”, in 
which each side would respect the other’s “core na-
tional interests”. Although realistic Chinese analysts 
understand the relationship between rising and de-
clining powers as an unavoidable zero-sum game – 
where one side’s gains are the other’s losses – they 
nonetheless see the Chinese and US governments as 
bearing a responsibility to prevent conflict (and cer-
tainly war) from breaking out.2 
 
2 For example Yan Xuetong, Leadership and the Rise of Great 
Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019). 
Beijing’s fears that Washington was ultimately 
seeking regime change in China deepened in the 
wake of the so-called “colour revolutions” of the 2000s 
and the Arab Spring of 2011. The Chinese wonder 
whether the United States would accept their coun-
try’s rise and its possible leading role in new tech-
nologies (artificial intelligence, 5G) if it was a democ-
racy based on the Western model. Is preserving 
American supremacy Washington’s prime interest – 
or would it be conceivable for it to give up this role in 
particular areas if China were to change fundamen-
tally, in other words democratise? 
A US-Dominated World Order 
China also takes an ambivalent view of the post-1945 
liberal world order and the values and institutions 
upon which it is built. That order and the globalisa-
tion process it gave rise to have enabled China to 
industrialise and modernise via market opening and 
market reforms, to largely eliminate absolute poverty, 
and to acquire international power and prestige. But 
ultimately, the Chinese believe, the Western liberal sys-
tem remains a manifestation of American hegemony. 
Beijing does not expect the United States to concede 
China the voice that its economic and political weight 
would merit.3 Chinese leaders are convinced that 
America and the West will never voluntarily grant 
China greater influence at the international level. In 
line with this, they believe, the role of a “responsible 
stakeholder” – as first demanded of Beijing in 2005 
by the then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick – would primarily strengthen America’s 
claims to hegemony but not benefit China’s economic 
development, still less its political rise. In any case, 
China regards the West’s advocacy of a liberal world 
order and universal human rights as a hegemonic 
discourse. 
The United States under Donald Trump 
Donald Trump’s election as US President in 2016 was 
officially welcomed; scholarly assessments of the im-
plications for the bilateral relationship were cautiously 
optimistic. Although Trump railed against China in 
 
3 Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, 
Opportunism, and Diversification, RAND Project Air Force (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009). 
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his election campaigning, most Chinese believed he 
was merely replicating a familiar pattern. Previous 
presidential candidates – Carter, Reagan, Clinton, 
Bush jr. – had presented China as competitor and 
adversary in their campaigns. But after taking office 
each newly elected Administration sooner or later 
found its way back to a pragmatic and cooperative 
policy towards Beijing. In the case of Trump, as a 
businessman, it was also assumed that a viable basis 
would be found. On that assumption, official and 
media responses to Trump’s attacks were restrained 
(except over Taiwan). There was also little public criti-
cism of his competence and leadership style. Even on 
Chinese social media the initial responses to Trump’s 
election tended to be positive. He was principally char-
acterised as an unorthodox personality, and his dis-
dain for political correctness was seen as refreshing.4 
Open admission that the dangers 
presented by Trump 
were underestimated. 
In the meantime, deep disillusionment seems to 
have set in.5 It is openly admitted that Trump’s un-
predictability, his willingness to escalate, and the 
dangers he poses to Chinese economic growth had 
been underestimated. The President’s trade-related 
accusations concerning China are rejected as un-
founded, illegitimate and without substance.6 The 
nationalist Global Times these days bluntly asserts that 
Washington has swung behind a course of contain-
ment, which is manifested in its Indo-Pacific strategy.7 
 
4 Diandian Guo, “‘Congratulations, It’s a Boy!’ – China’s 
(Mixed) Reactions to President Trump’s Election Victory”, 
What’s on Weibo: Reporting Social Trends in China website, 
9 December 2016, https://www.whatsonweibo.com/trumps-
election-victory-chinese-media-responds/ (accessed 19 Decem-
ber 2019); Camille Boullenois, “The Roots of Trump’s Behav-
ior and Strategy”, in The Trump Opportunity: Chinese Perceptions 
of the US Administration, ECFR China Analysis 262 (London: 
European Council on Foreign Relations [ECFR], June 2018), 
3f., https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-262-China_Analysis_ 
Chinese_perceptions_of_the_US_administration.pdf (accessed 
19 December 2019). 
5 Xue Li, “China and US: Are They Rivals or Enemies?”, 
Global Times, 20 August 2019; “Trump’s Impeachment Probe 
Jolts US Politics”, Global Times, 13 October 2019. 
6 For example, Yongding Yu, “A Trade War That Is Unwar-
ranted”, China and World Economy 26, no. 5 (2018): 38–61. 
7 For example in Ding Gang, “‘Balance of Power’ a Strategic 
Trap for India”, Global Times, 11 September 2019. 
The newspaper also demonstrates the new mood of self-
confidence, asserting that China can no longer be con-
tained and any attempt to do so would harm America 
more than China. But even the Global Times does not 
restrict itself to promoting a confrontative stance to-
wards the United States. Instead it expresses cautious 
optimism that a solution to the trade dispute can be 
found. A new Cold War, it says, is “unrealistic”.8 The 
dominant tone of official and published statements is 
that, in light of the bilateral tensions in the economic 
field, both sides need to seek compromise in order 
to avoid inflicting harm on themselves. But sceptics 
warn that a lasting and dependable trade peace will 
not be possible with President Trump. 
Official statements and media reports are highly 
critical when it comes to the recent protests in Hong 
Kong. Here the United States is sharply attacked, with 
the US Congress and the CIA accused of supporting 
the protests financially as well as verbally. Here again 
we see the narrative that the United States is seeking 
to weaken the Chinese system and ultimately achieve 
regime change in Beijing. This is because in Hong 
Kong “core national interests” such as China’s terri-
torial integrity are at stake. 
Back to the Future? 
China’s America analysts differ in their expectations 
of future developments in the Sino-American rela-
tionship. One camp hopes that both sides will return 
to pragmatic and constructive relations, whether by 
reaching an agreement with Trump over the trade dis-
pute or by his losing the next election. Another camp 
interprets the shift in Washington’s policy towards 
China as permanent and structural. They believe that 
a bipartisan consensus in the United States will deter-
mine the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable 
future (“no turning back”).9 More reform-oriented 
Chinese academics regard the pressure applied by the 
Trump Administration as counterproductive because 
it leads to a hardening of the defensive stance in the 
Chinese leadership. From this perspective, such fun-
 
8 “Goodwill Reciprocity Needed to End Trade War”, Global 
Times, 12 September 2019. 
9 An Gang, “Time for China to Forge a New Strategy to-
wards the US”, China-US Focus, 4 June 2019, https://www. 
chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/time-for-china-to-forge-a-
new-strategy-towards-the-us (accessed 19 December 2019). 
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damental attacks to the system principally harm the 
pro-reform forces. 
This is indirectly confirmed when official media 
write that the ongoing trade disputes have bolstered 
China’s determination to resist American bullying 
and defend its own rights and interests. Chinese ob-
servers of the economic conflict also sometimes point 
out that aside from trade and growth losses, opportu-
nities for China also arise. For example Washington’s 
technology boycott could accelerate China’s efforts to 
achieve autonomy in this field. They also note that 
Washington’s destructive, anti-WTO trade policies 
and its withdrawal from a series of international 
organisations and agreements has enhanced Beijing’s 
role at the global level.10 
A Differentiated Perception of Europe 
China’s perspective on Europe is less characterised by 
extremes. Although Europe – at the opposite end of 
the Eurasian landmass – is a pillar of the West and 
political ally of the United States, the Chinese regard 
it (unlike the United States) as presenting little ob-
stacle to its own development, and in fact tending to 
be useful. In China it is also noted that Europe works 
to preserve multilateralism and the liberal world order 
and indeed has its own political and economic prob-
lems with the Trump Administration. 
China as champion of 
multilateral international order? 
China likes to present itself as a defender of multi-
lateralism against Trump’s disruptive attacks on the 
international order, and offers itself as an alliance part-
ner to other states. But Germany and Europe should 
not be misled by Beijing’s rhetoric. In fact China 
opportunistically breaks multilateral rules as soon 
as that serves its interests: In its external economic 
policy China ignores fundamental WTO principles 
of non-discrimination and transparency, just as it 
ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling 
in its territorial dispute with the Philippines. There is 
certainly a fundamental difference between the Euro-
 
10 Jiakun Jack Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions of Trump’s 
Trade Policy”, in The Trump Opportunity (see note 4), 5ff. (7). 
pean and the Chinese understandings of multilateral-
ism.11 
 
11 Hanns Maull, The “Alliance for Multilateralism” by Germany 
and France: About Time, But It Needs To Be Serious, Point of View 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of-view/2019/the-
alliance-for-multilateralism-by-germany-and-france-about-
time-but-it-needs-to-be-serious/ (accessed 19 December 2019). 
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A China-critical consensus has coalesced in Washing-
ton over the past fifteen years, encompassing both 
parties in Congress as well as a broad spectrum of 
economic and societal actors. The most prominent 
factors working to give China a negative image in 
the United States have been its activities in the South 
China Sea, which are perceived as aggressive, its 
mercantilist trade practices, and the hardening of 
authoritarian tendencies. 
This development is closely associated with a belief 
that the engagement that the United States had pur-
sued since Nixon’s visit to Beijing 1972 has failed. 
This interpretation is summed up in the Trump Ad-
ministration’s first National Security Strategy of 2017: 
“For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that 
support for China’s rise and for its integration into 
the post-war international order would liberalize 
China.”1 There is almost unanimous agreement in 
Washington that the hope that China would become 
a “responsible stakeholder” – as formulated in 2005 
by then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick 
– has been dashed.2 
United States sees China growing 
from regional to global challenge. 
In the United States, the rise of China is increasingly 
seen as a danger to its own dominant position in the 
international system. The Trump Administration’s 
strategy documents describe China as an essentially 
revisionist power seeking regional hegemony in the 
Indo-Pacific and in the long term aiming for global 
supremacy. 
 
1 President of the United States, National Security Strategy of 
the United States (Washington D.C., December 2017), 25. 
2 Although this interpretation of “failed engagement” with 
China predominates in the United States today, other voices 
also exist. See Alastair I. Johnston, “The Failures of the 
‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”, Washington Quarterly 
42, no. 2 (2019): 99–114 (110). 
Multiple factors have come together in recent years 
to consolidate the fundamental China-critical mood 
in the US political system.3 China’s rise and the asso-
ciated gains in power and influence in ever more policy 
areas and world regions have strengthened fears and 
knee-jerk rejection in the United States. These have 
been boosted by President Xi Jinping’s course of 
authoritarianism and nationalism. 
As far as American domestic politics is concerned, 
China offers an ideal bogeyman for Donald Trump’s 
agenda and election slogans. But others outside the 
Trump camp also see an opportunity to blame China 
for deindustrialisation and other economic and social 
problems in the United States – even if these are 
actually attributable to a mix of policy failures and 
technological change. 
Normative, Security and Economic 
Dimensions of Criticism 
American criticisms of China have normative, secu-
rity and economic dimensions. The normative dimen-
sion, China’s threat to human rights and democratic 
values, has been central to the American debate since 
the bloody suppression of the student movement on 
Tiananmen Square in 1989. Human rights groups 
traditionally find it hard to gain a hearing against the 
powerful China lobby in American business, but feel 
their concerns have been confirmed as Beijing expands 
its surveillance state and constructs so-called reedu-
cation camps in the autonomous region of Xinjiang.4 
 
3 David Shambaugh, “The New American Bipartisan Con-
sensus on China Policy”, China-US Focus, 21 September 2018; 
Zack Cooper and Annie Kowalewski, A US Perspective (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute [AEI], 21 Decem-
ber 2018); Richard C. Bush and Ryan Hass, “The China 
Debate Is Here to Stay”, Order from Chaos blog, The Brookings 
Institution, 4 March 2019. 
4 On the changing context and mood, see Paul Sonne, “As 
Trump Escalates China Trade Dispute, Economic Ties Lose 
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The human rights situation in China has led to bi-
partisan initiatives in Congress, seeking to persuade 
the Administration to show a more forceful response 
to the repression of the Uigurs, for example through 
sanctions against Chinese officials.5 
Pro-democracy and human rights groups possess 
a powerful supporter in Congress: Nancy Pelosi, the 
Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
calls for a hard economic course against China, in-
cluding import tariffs, also on the basis of human 
rights concerns.6 
By the early 2000s, the security dimension of 
the rivalry between the United States and China was 
attracting growing attention. Since the National 
Security Strategy of 2002, US Administrations have 
explicitly raised the question of the modernisation 
of the Chinese armed forces.7 Initially the foremost 
concern was that China would sooner or later intimi-
date US allies in the region, above all South Korea and 
Japan; today the security threat has come to be re-
garded as global. One reason for this is the perceived 
convergence of the economic and security compo-
nents of the rivalry. This perspective surfaces for 
example in the Pentagon’s annual report on China’s 
military strength, which reviews Chinese investments 
in security-relevant areas and regards this as a matter 
of great concern. This applies in the first place to in-
vestments in technologies that have direct military 
uses. But the Pentagon also worries about strategic 
benefits of Chinese investments in foreign infrastruc-
ture, such as port facilities, which are part of the Belt 
and Road Initiative.8 
 
Stabilizing Force in Matters of National Security”, Washington 
Post, 19 May 2019. 
5 Edward Wong, “Lawmakers Push Trump to Act against 
China on Uighur Detention”, New York Times, 14 December 
2018. 
6 Council on Foreign Relations, “A Conversation with 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi”, 13 June 2019, https://www.cfr. 
org/event/conversation-house-speaker-nancy-pelosi (accessed 
26 August 2019); Kenneth Rapoza, “Dear Chinese Govern-
ment, The Democrats Won’t Save You”, Forbes (online), 
5 December 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/ 
2018/11/05/dear-chinese-government-the-democrats-wont-
save-you/#73b31c795f51 (accessed 26 August 2019). 
7 On the security dimension of the Sino-American conflict, 
see also the contribution by Marco Overhaus and Michael 
Paul in this volume, pp. 20ff. 
8 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019: Annual Report to 
Congress (Washington, D.C., 2 May 2019), 11, https://media. 
Large parts of the US private sector shares the 
Trump Administration’s criticisms of “predatory” 
Chinese economic practices, the biggest complaints 
being state subsidies for Chinese firms, forced tech-
nology transfer from foreign companies, and theft 
of intellectual property. But not all sectors and com-
panies support Trump’s protectionist tariffs and his 
hard economic line against China. 
President Trump continues to receive support from 
business sectors that have suffered from intense com-
petition, such as producers of steel and aluminium. 
The escalation of trade sanctions is opposed by compa-
nies that are negatively affected, directly or indirectly, 
by import tariffs on semi-finished products or counter-
tariffs imposed by China and other trading partners. 
This applies to US importers, for example the retail 
sector, and increasingly to export-oriented businesses 
such as the farm sector, car-makers, and IT and com-
munications companies. 
After Trump threatened to raise tariffs again in two 
stages by the end of 2019, criticism from US business-
es, Republicans in Congress and also the trade unions 
swelled to a level that even he was unable to ignore.9 
Instead of imposing new tariffs, the Administration 
agreed to a limited “Phase One Deal” with China,10 
which might be followed by another agreement and 
a mutual dismantling of tariffs. 
As far as the geographical dimension of the Sino-
American conflict is concerned, it should be noted 
that Washington has come to regard China as a threat 
to US and Western interests even in regions outside 
the Indo-Pacific “core” of the rivalry. This applies 
across the board to Africa and the Middle East, but is 
currently manifested most clearly in the Arctic. As 
well as a struggle over the resources there, Washing-
ton also fears the Chinese could establish a military 
presence.11 
 
defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_China_ 
Military_Power_Report.pdf (accessed 8 October 2019). 
9 Rebecca Klar, “Trump Fires Back at AFL-CIO Chief 
Trumka: ‘No Wonder Unions Are Losing So Much’”, 
The Hill, 2 September 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/ 
administration/459610-trump-lashes-out-at-afl-cio-chief-
trumka-no-wonder-unions-are-losing (accessed 4 December 
2019). 
10 Wang Cong, “Experts Dismiss Negative Media Reports 
about Phase One Deal”, Global Times, 25 December 2019. 
11 See also the contribution by Marco Overhaus and 
Michael Paul in this volume, pp. 20ff. 
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Congress in the China Debate 
The US Congress tends to support and intensify the 
Administration’s hard line on China, rather than 
moderating it. This holds true for both parties.12 
Leading Democrats in Congress and almost all Demo-
cratic candidates in the primaries for the 2020 presi-
dential elections propagated policies similar to 
Trump’s on China, even if they criticised his style of 
politics by tweet and accused him of neglecting allies 
in Asia and Europe. Chuck Schumer, Democratic 
Senate Minority Leader, said in May 2019: “We have 
to have tough, strong policies against China or they’ll 
continue to steal millions of American jobs and tril-
lions of American dollars.”13 
Congress’s initiatives and legislative proposals do 
reflect a changing mood in the business community 
and the society. But China-critical statements by 
politicians from both parties already had a great in-
fluence on the public mood before Trump was 
elected. 
President and Congress follow a hard 
line on China but differ over means. 
The difference between the position of the Trump 
Administration on the one side and the two parties 
in Congress on the other lies in the question of which 
means are most suitable for the competition with 
China. Both Republicans and Democrats criticise the 
way the President’s threats of tariffs and other meas-
ures alienate America’s allies in Europe and Asia and 
thus weaken Washington’s hand against Beijing. As 
presidential and congressional election campaigning 
gets under way in the United States, the Democrats 
are loudly voicing this criticism. 
Opinions also diverge between Administration and 
Congress over Trump’s preferred instrument against 
China, unilateral import tariffs. Both the private sec-
tor and the two political parties are increasingly con-
cerned about negative repercussions of the trade 
conflict with China, above all for American consum-
ers and the agricultural sector. In view of the looming 
 
12 For detail see Robert Sutter, “Congress and Trump Ad-
ministration China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy 
Adjustments and Hardening toward Beijing”, Journal of Con-
temporary China 28, no. 118 (2019): 519–37. 
13 “McConnell, Schumer Call for China Trade Solution”, 
AP Archive, 14 May 2019, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=iXx_LV8MyR8 (accessed 20 December 2019). 
presidential and congressional elections in November 
2020, Trump and the Republicans risk paying for 
their tariff policies at the polls. Republican Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, for example, said 
that the trade conflict could harm the United States.14 
Outside of the “hard” areas of security policy and 
the economy, there is another new worry: Chinese 
influence spreading in the United States via channels 
such as the Confucius Institutes, and via Chinese 
grants for or investments in think-tanks, universities, 
media and business.15 Congress responded to this 
mood with a number of hearings and legislative pro-
posals, including the Foreign Influence and Trans-
parency Act and the Countering Foreign Propaganda 
Act.16 Concerns over Chinese influence go hand in 
hand with fears of espionage.17 With the trade con-
flict in the background, this anti-Chinese mood in 
politics and business has also coloured public 
opinion.18 
Moderate Voices Unheard in Washington 
There are foreign policy specialists and China experts 
in the United States who draw attention to the dan-
gers of a largely confrontative policy, do not regard 
the earlier China policy as wholly mistaken, and 
attempt to counteract the narrowing of the discourse. 
 
14 Majid Sattar, “Lebenszeichen der Freihändler? Die 
Sorge vor einer Rezession treibt Amerika um”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 August 2019. 
15 For an examle of these new sensitivities, see in particu-
lar Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence 
and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance: Report 
of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United 
States, rev. ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2019). 
16 Rush Doshi and Robert D. Williams, “Is China Inter-
fering in American Politics?” Lawfare blog, The Lawfare Insti-
tute, 1 October 2018. 
17 These fears sometimes appear paranoid. In one exam-
ple, it was suggested that if a Chinese manufacturer won the 
contract to build new trains for the Washington Metro, it 
might install malware in the security cameras allowing users 
to be identified with facial recognition software, their move-
ments tracked and their conversations eavesdropped. See 
Robert McCartney and Faiz Siddiqui, “Could a Chinese-made 
Metro Car Spy on Us? Many Experts Say Yes”, Washington Post, 
7 January 2019. 
18 Peter Rudolf, The Sino-American World Conflict, SWP 
Research Paper 03/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, February 2020), 30, note 177, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/the-sino-american-world-conflict/. 
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However, they tend to be marginalised. Fundamen-
tal discomfort over the trend in US policy towards 
China was expressed in an open letter to the President 
and Congress initiated by a group of China experts 
and signed by another hundred individuals including 
many who worked on China in earlier Administra-
tions. They advise explicitly against treating China 
as a “an economic enemy or an existential national 
security threat”. “The fear that Beijing will replace 
the United States as the global leader is exaggerated,” 
they say, adding that “it is not clear that Beijing itself 
sees this goal as necessary or feasible”.19 
Proponents of this position, which amounts to a 
kind of “smart competition”, warn against abandon-
ing all cooperation with China and seeking to prevent 
any increases in Chinese influence. From this perspec-
tive, US policy towards China with its mixture of co-
operation, deterrence and pressure has been broadly 
successful over the past decades. But in their view 
there is a need for a correction, a change in the mix 
towards pressure and deterrence in order to respond 
to China’s more strongly mercantilist economic policy 
and its growing assertiveness in foreign policy.20 
In terms of German and European interests it 
would be desirable if US critics of a one-sidedly con-
frontative China policy were able to gain a better 
hearing in Washington. A US China policy that pru-
dently weighs the cooperative and confrontative 
approaches would reduce the pressure on Berlin and 
other European capitals to choose between the United 
States and China in many important areas. 
 
19 M. Taylor Fravel et al., “China Is Not an Enemy”, 
Washington Post, 3 July 2019. 
20 Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk (Chairs), Course Correc-
tion: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy, Task Force 
Report (New York: Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China Rela-
tions, February 2019). Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan 
argue similarly in “Competition without Catastrophe: How 
America Can Both Challenge and Coexist with China”, 
Foreign Affairs 98, no. 5 (2019), https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-
catastrophe (accessed 20 December 2019). Campbell, who 
served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs under President Barack Obama, was also a 
member of the Task Force on US-China Policy that produced 
the cited report. 
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Any military conflict between the United States and 
China would have enormous regional and global im-
pacts. Both Beijing and Washington insist that their 
own intentions are fundamentally defensive while 
accusing the other of adopting an aggressive stance.1 
In both the US Administration and Congress the view 
predominates today that China – like Russia – is a 
“revisionist power” seeking to challenge the domi-
nance of the United States and undermine the rules-
based international order. 
Moreover, Washington believes that China – un-
like Russia – possesses the political, economic and 
increasingly also military means to expand its influ-
ence globally. Beijing in turn accuses the United 
States of keeping China down and working to impede 
its progress. The historical experience of vulnerability 
and the “century of humiliation” (1840–1949) shapes 
China’s strategic culture to this day and represents an 
important element of the Chinese nationalism that 
connects nation and party. 
Against this background, the relationship between 
the United States and China exhibits characteristics 
of a classical security dilemma, where each side’s 
striving for greater security ultimately generates more 
insecurity on both sides. In this case the problem is 
exacerbated by the constellation of a rising power 
encountering an established one. 
 
1 Peter Rudolf, The Sino-American World Conflict, SWP 
Research Paper 3/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, February 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
publication/the-sino-american-world-conflict/; Michael Nacht, 
Sarah Laderman and Julie Beeston, Strategic Competition in 
China-US Relations, Livermore Papers on Global Security 5 
(Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
October 2018), 53, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/ 
CGSR_livpaper5.pdf (accessed 11 October 2019). 
Beijing’s Perspective 
China finds itself in a geopolitical environment that is 
one of the world’s most difficult. It lacks the “insular” 
security of the United States.2 Its 22,000 kilometres 
of land border touch on fourteen neighbouring states, 
four of which possess nuclear arms (Russia, India, 
Pakistan and the erratic dictatorship in North Korea). 
With more than 18,000 kilometres of coastline, its 
waters adjoin those of another six neighbouring states, 
some of which host US military bases. In recent 
decades China has peacefully resolved many of its 
border conflicts. But its rise to become a great power 
also brings forth complex new security problems. 
Beijing promises new strength 
against historical humiliation 
by foreign powers. 
China is pursuing an ambitious foreign policy and 
equipping its armed forces to fulfil the security needs 
of state and party. Growing national prosperity is a 
development goal of the Communist Party. So politi-
cal stability depends heavily on maritime trade routes 
that need to be secured by an expanded navy. But 
China’s military build-up stands increasingly in con-
tradiction to the official rhetoric of a peaceful devel-
opment path. Its military power enables Beijing to 
pursue a robust foreign policy that increasingly trou-
bles its Asian neighbours and the United States. For 
example, Japan regards China’s regional policy as 
 
2 The Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans grant the United 
States a level of security that can only be threatened by a 
rival of equal strenght on the opposite side of the Atlantic or 
Pacific. See Michael Paul, Kriegsgefahr im Pazifik? Die maritime 
Bedeutung der sino-amerikanischen Rivalität (Baden-Baden, 2017), 
29–35. 
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“incompatible with [the] existing international order” 
and as a “serious security concern for the region”.3 
The Chinese leadership paints the country as a 
historical victim, having suffered humiliation at 
the hands of foreign powers. Beijing promises new 
strength and vigour, both externally and towards its 
 
3 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2019 (Tokyo, 2019), 
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2019.html (accessed 
10 March 2020), 44. 
own population. From this point of view, even its claim 
on the South China Sea appears historically justified. 
In other words it invokes a moral exceptionalism to 
legitimise the unlawful appropriation of territory. 
President Xi Jinping has gone as far as making the 
fate of his country dependent on use of the seas.4 His 
 
4 “Whether we are able to solve successfully problems 
of the oceans is related to the existence and development of 
our nation, the rise or fall of our country. … We must 
Map 1 
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“Chinese Dream” of a great renaissance of the Chi-
nese nation begins at the sea: The only way forward 
is to break free of the Yellow River – as a metaphor 
for parochialism and stagnation – and turn to the 
great blue ocean and the outside world. The Indo-
Pacific sea routes are of vital importance for China; 
its naval build-up is designed to secure them and to 
project power globally.5 
Against this background, China is undergoing a 
transition from coastal defence to “active defence”. 
This means first of all controlling the space within 
the “first island chain”, which includes the Yellow 
Sea bordered by Korea and Japan, the western part of 
the East China Sea with Taiwan, and the South China 
Sea. Beijing would also like to bring under its con-
trol the area further east, within the “second island 
chain” that extends from the Kurils through Japan 
and then via the Bonins and the Marianas to the Caro-
lines. That would leave Beijing in control of the sea 
routes of East Asia. But its naval thinking is already 
turning to more distant goals. 
The economically plausible expansion of China’s 
naval activities is already altering the balance of 
power in the eastern hemisphere. Beijing is pursuing 
risk mitigation and is concerned – like the United 
States – to protect strategically important routes in 
order to safeguard its supplies in the event of crisis. 
China’s role in the global economy makes securing 
its sea routes a political imperative and an integral 
aspect of the national interest, given that 90 percent 
of its trade in goods and 40 percent of its imported oil 
are transported by sea.6 To that extent the creation of 
an ocean-going navy can be regarded as the maritime 
continuation of the reform policy initiated by Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1980s. 
Today the Chinese armed forces are capable of con-
trolling the waters within the first island chain (at 
least temporarily). The Taiwan crisis of 1995/1996, 
 
adhere to a development path of becoming a rich and 
powerful state by making use of the sea.” Xi Jinping, “Fur-
ther Have Concern for, Recognize, and Manage Oceans to 
Make New Achievements Continuously for Pushing Forward 
the Construction of Sea Power”, in Xi Jinping’s Important Expo-
sition, 30 July 2013, quoted in Paul, Kriegsgefahr im Pazifik? 
(see note 2), 25. 
5 Paul, Kriegsgefahr im Pazifik? (see note 2), 49–72. 
6 Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Dependence on the Global 
Maritime Commons”, in China, the United States, and 21st Cen-
tury Seapower, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and 
Nan Li (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 14–37 
(18). 
when the United States deployed two aircraft carriers 
to force China to back down, is regarded as the trigger 
of this capability-building process. The Taiwan crisis 
was the turning point that exposed the weaknesses of 
the Chinese armed forces at that time. 
In the meantime China has acquired the world’s 
largest navy in numerical terms – implying a great 
deal about intentions but revealing little about capa-
bilities.7 The Chinese navy possesses more than three 
hundred warships, while the US Navy’s fleet, with 
responsibilities around the world, has numbered be-
tween 279 and 290 vessels in recent years. Now China’s 
fleet is to be further modernised and equipped for 
operations on the high seas. But it is questionable 
whether it can also become the qualitative – and not 
just quantitative – equal of the US Navy. That would 
require even more naval investment, training and exer-
cises. It will be long after the conclusion of the Chi-
nese military modernisation programme in 2035 
before China can match the United States on the high 
seas and in complex operations involving carrier 
groups. 
Washington’s Perspective 
Seen from Washington, China does not yet represent 
a direct threat to the continental United States. Never-
theless, three aspects of military developments in 
China are regarded as a danger to America’s security 
and vital interests. Firstly, the United States sees its 
role as world power challenged by China’s ongoing 
naval expansion. The United States has dominated 
the oceans of the world as Great Britain once did, and 
has used that power to secure the freedom of the seas. 
Unhampered navigation is a global common good, 
comparable to the skies, outer space and cyberspace. 
Like China, the United States also regards the 
oceans and sea routes as the basis for its own eco-
nomic strength, accounting as they do for more than 
90 percent of long-distance international trade and 
secure supplies of raw materials and industrial prod-
ucts. But the oceans also enable power projection and 
military intervention. As China steadily upgrades the 
capabilities of its armed forces, they are increasingly 
 
7 Andrew S. Erickson, “Numbers Matter: China’s Three 
‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships”, The National 
Interest, 26 February 2018; Charlie Lyons Jones, “Xi Believes 
a ‘Peace Disease’ Hampers China’s Military Modernization”, 
Strategist, 26 August 2019. 
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in a position to close down the US Navy’s access to 
the Asia-Pacific region and thus challenge America’s 
status as a global power.8 
Washington sees China’s growing 
military capabilities as a threat. 
Secondly, the United States regards China’s grow-
ing military capabilities as a threat to its military 
bases in Japan, South Korea and the US territory of 
Guam. One reason why the Trump Administration 
withdrew from Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty with Russia was the hope that this would 
enable it to better counter the Chinese threat. Admi-
ral Phil Davidson, Commander of the US forces in the 
Indo-Pacific, told a congressional hearing in 2019 that 
95 percent of Chinese ballistic missiles would not be 
permitted under the INF treaty. In his view for the US 
to have “a land-based component with that kind of 
capability restores maneuver to the force.”9 
Washington maintains a system of alliances and 
partnerships with countries that feel threatened by 
China. For example Washington has declared that 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered 
by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing, fall under its 
bilateral defence agreement with Japan. A military 
conflict between China and an alliance partner would 
put Washington in a tight spot, at least assuming the 
Trump Administration continues to value the cred-
ibility of American security guarantees. 
 
8 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019: Annual Report 
to Congress (Washington, D.C., 2 May 2019), 31, https:// 
media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_ 
China_Military_Power_Report.pdf (accessed 8 October 2019). 
9 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Stenographic 
Transcript before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate: Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States 
Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea in Review 
of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the 
Future Years Defense Program, Washington, D.C., 12 February 
2019 (accessed 27 February 2020). This argument has been 
challenged, though, by some experts. They raise the question 
where – on the territory of which alliance partners – the 
United States would be able to station ground-launched 
intermediate-range missiles and which targets in China they 
could reach from there. See Shahryar Pasandideh, “The End 
of the ‘INF Treaty’ and the US-China Military Balance”, 
Nonproliferation Review 26, no. 3–4 (2019), 267–87, doi: 
10.1080/10736700.2019.1646466. 
Thirdly the American perspective on China is 
strongly shaped by longer-term developments. China 
is expanding its military capabilities in order to be 
able to project power through and beyond the first 
and second island chains.10 This stokes fears in 
Washington that China could also come to directly 
threaten the United States. 
China opened its first foreign military base in 
August 2017, at the Horn of Africa, and Washington 
expects others to follow.11 Finally Beijing is building 
additional competence and capabilities in precisely 
those spheres of military operations that are by defi-
nition global: space and cyberspace. From the US per-
spective, China’s military capabilities in those areas 
represent an imminent danger. 
The Nuclear Component 
Nuclear weapons play an important role for Chinese 
foreign and security policy.12 They are not as yet cen-
tral to the security competition between the United 
States and China. From China’s perspective they sym-
bolise great power status and serve above all as a 
deterrent to other nuclear-armed states. In the first 
place this means the United States, to deter it from 
military intervention or any direct threat to the Chi-
nese mainland. China officially pursues a policy of no 
first use (NFU). But US missile defence initiatives and 
the expansion of conventional US forces leave Beijing 
fearing losing its second-strike capability and thus its 
nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Washington. This threat 
perception is strengthened by the fact that the United 
States does not openly recognise the principle of 
mutually assured destruction with respect to China 
and keeps this question intentionally ambivalent. 
The nuclear threat from North Korea serves the 
United States as justification for establishing its own 
missile defences in North-East Asia. But the Chinese 
leadership does not regard the existence of North 
Korean missiles alone as enough to justify the Ameri-
can behaviour. Beijing believes Washington’s asser-
tions are an excuse to install a system capable of 
 
10 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (see note 8), 54, 62. 
11 Ibid., 16. 
12 Michael Paul, Chinas nukleare Abschreckung: Ursachen, Mittel 
und Folgen der Stationierung chinesischer Nuklearwaffen auf Unter-
seebooten, SWP-Studie 17/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, August 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
publikation/chinas-nukleare-abschreckung/. 
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threatening strategic stability, specifically to neutral-
ise the Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents in 
a military conflict. Finally, Washington’s ability to 
intervene militarily can also be supported by missile 
defence systems. 
North Korea’s successful tests of long-range mis-
siles have not changed the Chinese assessment. For 
the United States the specific threat presented by 
long-range missiles is central.13 That is why Trump 
refrained from criticising North Korea’s tests of short-
range ballistic missiles in August 2019. China’s threat 
analysis, meanwhile, continues to centre on the ex-
pandability of the US missile defence system, specif-
ically on flexibly deployable Aegis vessels and land-
based systems. Ultimately, if US, South Korean or 
Japanese radar systems on land and at sea can track 
the trajectory of a North Korean missile, then they 
can certainly also do the same for Chinese missiles. 
Here Beijing’s threat perception coincides with Mos-
cow’s. That congruence is one of the foundations of 
the “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordina-
tion” between China and Russia, which is manifested 
in arms cooperation and joint military manoeuvres. 
One American response to the North Korean mis-
sile issue is the development of strategic conventional 
systems. The US Prompt Global Strike programme 
proposes hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) capable of 
conducting conventional strikes anywhere in the 
world within an hour, ostensibly in order to prevent 
the launch of an intercontinental missile from North 
Korea. But such highly advanced technology is not 
required to overcome North Korea’s primitive air 
defences. Chinese experts therefore suspect that 
China’s nuclear arsenal is the real target. They fear 
that in the event of conflict the United States could 
launch a preemptive disarming attack. 
In the meantime China and Russia have them-
selves acquired HGV technologies. From the Chinese 
perspective the advantage of hypersonic glide vehi-
cles, whether conventionally or nuclear armed, is 
that they cannot be detected and destroyed by any 
currently available defence system. In other words, 
China is using a US-initiated technology to counter 
a challenge presented to its own nuclear deterrent by 
 
13 Michael Paul and Elisabeth Suh, North Korea’s Nuclear-
Armed Missiles: Options for the US and its Allies, SWP Comment 
32/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 
2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/north-
koreas-nuclear-armed-missiles/. 
the American decision to deploy missile defence sys-
tems. 
The ongoing modernisation of the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal is also of concern to the United States.14 China 
wants to introduce new intercontinental missiles, 
develop a new air-launched ballistic missile and with 
Russia’s support establish a missile early warning 
system. This generates suspicions over China’s future 
nuclear strategy. Washington is increasingly clear 
that it is no longer in a bilateral security dilemma – 
as in the Cold War – but a multilateral one. The 
situation is exacerbated by North Korea’s develop-
ment of long-range nuclear missiles. Instead of arms 
control the United States is relying in the first place 
on flexibilising its own options. This further increases 
the danger of an arms race. 
 
14 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (see note 8), 65. 
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Sino-American foreign economic and finance rela-
tions have never been free of conflict. But for a very 
long time they could be regarded as a stabilising 
factor within the bilateral Sino-US relationship, from 
which both sides could draw enormous benefits. US 
businesses made fabulous profits from exports to and 
investments in the Chinese market, and transferred 
capital, management expertise and technology. By 
exporting to a US market whose capacity to absorb 
goods appeared infinite, China in turn accumulated 
immense surpluses which it reinvested in US treasury 
bonds and thus co-financed America’s consumption-
driven economic boom. That symbiotic relation-
ship – sometimes referred to as “Chimerica” – no 
longer exists.1 Rather the Sino-American rivalry is 
currently nowhere as openly confrontational as at the 
economic level. What is more, both sides instrumen-
talise trade policy in their technology competition as 
well as for foreign policy and security purposes. 
United States and China on 
Economic Collision Course 
Objective economic causes can be identified behind 
this shift from cooperation to confrontation. The 
advantages both sides derive from economic coopera-
tion have become smaller. But status competition 
in the context of the new great power rivalry and 
increasingly critical perceptions on both sides have 
also played a major role. 
China’s meteoric economic and technological rise 
has created a situation where economic relations be-
tween America and China are today far less comple-
mentary and much more competitive. It has become 
harder for US companies to increase sales and make 
 
1 Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, “Chimerica and 
the Global Asset Market Boom”, International Finance 10, no. 3 
(2007): 215–39. 
profits in the Chinese market – especially as ad-
ministrative restrictions are increasing rather than 
decreasing – and many service branches in which 
US businesses possess competitive advantages remain 
closed to them. Conversely the United States has 
become reluctant to transfer technology. And now 
that China’s purchases of US treasury bonds have 
fallen in the wake of shrinking current account sur-
pluses, Chinese savings have ceased to contribute 
to financing America’s domestic economy in any 
significant way. 
United States accuses China of 
unfair competition. 
While complementarity is diminishing, competi-
tion has become fiercer, especially in manufacturing. 
China’s rise to become the world’s foremost industrial 
manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural 
change, particularly in the United States, and has trig-
gered social upheavals in America’s “Rust Belt”, which 
are concentrated in particular sectors and regions. 
The impact of this “China shock” was felt much more 
strongly in the United States than for example in 
Germany. An empirically well-founded study by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has 
shown that imports from China accounted for about 
one quarter of the decline in manufacturing jobs in 
the United States between 1990 and 2007.2 The com-
petitive challenge posed by China now extends far 
into the spheres of high-tech. With its industrial 
policy strategy “Made in China 2025”, Beijing has laid 
out its intention to achieve global market leadership 
in ten key high-value-added sectors. Already today US 
and Chinese companies compete fiercely in the fields 
 
2 David H. Autor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, 
“The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import 
Competition in the United States”, American Economic Review 
103, no. 6 (2013): 2121–68. 
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of communications technology and artificial intel-
ligence for the lead in both development and setting 
standards and systems. The United States accuse China 
of unfair competition, for example by closing its mar-
kets with protectionist measures, discriminating 
against foreign suppliers, and exerting direct and arbi-
trary influence on markets and crucial businesses.3 
Power Shifts and the New US Trade Policy 
China’s challenge to the United States is not restricted 
to industrial competition, but also extends to its posi-
tion and status as the leading global trading and eco-
nomic power. In terms of purchasing power parity 
China is already the world’s largest economy. And at 
market prices China’s gross domestic product already 
shows the largest gross fixed capital formation and the 
largest industrial value creation. In absolute terms 
China is the largest contributor to world economic 
growth as well as the largest exporter and largest 
trading nation.4 If current growth trends continue, 
China will replace the United States as the world’s 
largest economy by 2030, although this is by no 
means a foregone conclusion. With reference to this 
shift in economic power, official Chinese voices 
counter US criticisms – arguing that the accusation 
that the People’s Republic is employing unfair trade 
practices is merely a pretext for a foreign policy of 
containment.5 
Trade conflict is understood as a 
system-to-system conflict. 
Another reason why this geo-economic shift is 
problematic is that America and China have different 
ideas about international order. Washington wonders 
whether the Chinese economic model (a politically 
 
3 Dennis Shea, “China’s Trade-disruptive Economic Model 
and Implications for the WTO: Statement Delivered at the 
WTO General Council”, U.S. Mission to International Organi-
zations in Geneva website, Geneva, 26 July 2019. 
4 C. Fred Bergsten, “China and the United States: The Con-
test for Global Economic Leadership”, China and World Econo-
my 26, no. 5 (2018): 16ff.; Feng Lu, “China-US Trade Disputes 
in 2018: An Overview”, China and World Economy 26, no. 5 
(2018): 92ff. 
5 “People’s Daily 2018”, quoted in Chi Hung Kwan, “The 
China-US Trade War: Deep-Rooted Causes, Shifting Focus 
and Uncertain Prospects”, Asian Economic Policy Review 15, 
no. 1 (2019): 73–74. 
authoritarian, interventionist, mercantilist state capi-
talism) can be compatible with a world trade and 
finance system built on liberal principles. The ques-
tion has grown in urgency as the expectation in the 
West that China would become economically and 
politically liberal has been disappointed, an expec-
tation that was linked above all to the country’s acces-
sion to the World Trade Organisation. In fact the 
influence exerted by party and state on the economy 
has increased under Xi Jinping, and the exercise of 
power has become more authoritarian and doctrinal. 
The trade conflict is therefore also understood as a 
system-to-system conflict.6 
At the same time America’s trade policy has wit-
nessed a paradigmatic and political turn to protec-
tionism. The guiding principle for US trade policy 
today is no longer free trade, but “fair and reciprocal” 
with bilateral trade balances becoming the decisive 
criterion. In his statements and actions, US President 
Donald Trump casts aside the established tenets of 
trade theory and the empirical experience of trade 
policy.7 In political practice his motto is “America 
First”, prioritising US interests over obligations deriv-
ing from international treaties and multilateral rules. 
And he has no qualms about imposing unilateral pro-
tectionist measures to exert pressure on trade part-
ners. He accepts the erosion or even destruction of 
international rules as a price worth paying, and in 
some cases even actively pursues this. 
Trade policy has become a central issue for Trump’s 
presidency. Here the Administration’s interest is not 
solely in domestic value creation and employment, 
but also and above all the overarching category of 
national security. Washington believes that protect-
ing the national interest requires America’s strategic 
industries to possess supply chains that are independ-
 
6 C. Fred Bergsten, China and the United States: Trade Conflict 
and Systemic Competition, Policy Brief 18–21 (Washington, 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics [PIIE], 
October 2018), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/ 
pb18-21.pdf (accessed 29 December 2019); for a European 
perspective, see Clemens Fuest, Der dritte Systemwettbewerb, 
ifo Standpunkt 200 (Munich: ifo Institut für Wirtschafts-
forschung, 2018). 
7 The renowned economist William Nordhaus speaks of a 
“Trump doctrine”. William Nordhaus, “The Trump Doctrine 
on International Trade: Part One”, Vox CEPR Policy Portal, 
8 October 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/trump-doctrine-
international-trade-part-one (accessed 29 December 2019). 
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ent of China.8 In general, the economic and techno-
logical rise of the strategic rival China must certainly 
not be further accelerated by economic exchange 
with America. In order to throttle the modernisation 
of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Trump 
Administration believes it is necessary to pursue a 
strategy of economic decoupling from China. Tariffs, 
investment controls and supplier boycotts are the 
effective trade policy instruments of such a decou-
pling.9 
From Integration to Decoupling 
The Trump Administration has confronted all 
America’s major trading partners with unilateral 
demands and measures. But China has borne the 
brunt of trade confrontations. The new US National 
Security Strategy published in December 2017 iden-
tifies China’s trade and economic policies as one of 
America’s central foreign policy and security chal-
lenges and threats.10 The investigation report under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, published by the 
United States Trade Representative, in March 2018, 
describes China’s industrial and technology policy 
as “unfair and inequitable”.11 These two government 
documents mark the definitive end of American 
engagement policy towards China. America’s trade 
policy towards China is now definitely in “decoupling 
mode”. In order to correct what it sees as unfair, 
disadvantageous trade, financial and technology ex-
change with China, the Trump Administration has 
imposed a series of measures directed against China:12 
 
8 Rana Foroohar, “Globalised Business Is a US Security 
Issue”, Financial Times, 16 July 2018. 
9 Also Kwan, “The China-US Trade War” (see note 5), 5f. 
10 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America (Washington, D.C., 2017). 
11 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 empowers the US 
Trade Representative to investigate and respond to unfair 
trade practices by America’s trade partners; United States 
Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s 
Acts, Policies, and Practises Related to Technology Transfer, Intellec-
tual Property and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974 (Washington, D.C., March 2018). 
12 On these measures, see Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, 
Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide (Washington, 
D.C.: PIIE, 23 August 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-
investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide 
(accessed 29 December 2019); Kwan, “The China-US Trade 
War” (see note 5), 6–13. 
∎ Incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of 
up to 25 percent on about half of US imports from 
China. 
∎ State controls on foreign direct investment in secu-
rity-relevant sectors have been tightened using 
administrative measures and legislation, leading to 
a significant decline in Chinese investment in the 
United States. 
∎ Department of Commerce controls on export and 
licensing of security-relevant technologies to 
China. 
∎ In the area of public procurement Washington 
has restricted the use of particular Chinese prod-
ucts (telecommunications, visual surveillance). 
∎ Chinese businesses and individuals listed in the 
Department of Commerce’s “Entity List” are pro-
hibited from making purchases in the United 
States or from US companies. The Chinese technol-
ogy supplier Huawei was put on the Entity List in 
mid-May 2019. 
China’s response to these measures has to date 
been comparatively restrained. China has refrained 
from pouring additional oil onto the fire, likely out 
of concern to avoid a further escalation that would 
harm its own economy. Thus China has “only” im-
posed reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from 
the United States. At the same time, it unilaterally 
reduced its tariffs on imports from third states, which 
has the effect of additionally disadvantaging imports 
from the United States. And Chinese businesses are 
actively seeking suppliers capable of substituting 
imports from the United States.13 Beijing has also 
considered placing an export embargo on rare earths, 
which are crucial for high-tech manufacturing. China 
responded to Huawei’s inclusion in the Entity List 
with an announcement that it would create its own 
“Unreliable Entities List” of all businesses, organisa-
tions and individuals that comply with US boycotts 
calls, for example against Huawei. The listed entities 
would face disadvantages in the Chinese market.14 
Chinese consumers also launched campaigns calling 
for boycotts of American goods. 
 
13 See Chad P. Bown, Eujn Jung and Eva Zhang, Trump Has 
Gotten China to Lower Its Tariffs, Just toward Everyone Else (Wash-
ington, D.C.: PIIE, 12 June 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/ 
trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trump-has-gotten-china-
lower-its-tariffs-just-toward (accessed 29 December 2019). 
14 Kwan, “The China-US Trade War” (see note 5), 13f. 
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Another escalation of the tariff and 
trade war cannot be excluded. 
On 13 December 2019, both sides agreed on a par-
tial Phase One agreement. In it, the United States (and 
China) renounce the announced increase in special 
tariffs, while China promises additional imports from 
the United States amounting to $200 billion for the 
years 2020 and 2021. China also promises better pro-
tection of intellectual property, an end to forced tech-
nology transfer and better market access in financial 
services. The previous special tariffs will remain in 
place, however. And the controversies over subsidies, 
state enterprises and technology remain unresolved. 
It is unlikely that it will be possible to resolve these 
points as planned in a second partial agreement 
before the US presidential elections. But even if this 
were to occur, the fundamental political conflict 
would remain unresolved and a new trade policy 
escalation would be possible at any time. What is 
more, China’s additional US imports are likely to lead 
to correspondingly lower imports from Brazil, the 
European Union, Japan, etc. and trigger new contro-
versies. Furthermore, Washington is still undecided 
on the extent to which the US economy should 
decouple from the Chinese. And China, too, has lost 
confidence in the reliability and integrity of the 
American president and is therefore unlikely to be 
prepared to make concessions. 
Consequences and Escalation Risks 
The expected continuation of the conflict, and even 
more so its potential escalation, threaten the very 
institutional foundations of the world trade and 
finance system. The Sino-American trade, economic 
and technology conflict has already caused consider-
able economic harm, affecting third parties as well 
as the antagonists themselves. 
The tit-for-tat extraordinary tariffs imposed by the 
United States and China have led to significant reduc-
tions in bilateral trade and in some cases drastically 
increased the cost of the respective imports. Importers 
have switched to alternative suppliers, to the benefit 
of states such as Vietnam, Mexico and the European 
Union. To some extent production has also been 
relocated. Altogether the supply and sales risks of for-
eign trade have increased the world over. Investors 
play for time, investments are being reduced to a risk-
limiting minimum. This uncertainty has contributed 
significantly to the economic slow-down in 2019. 
Both China and the United States have caused 
damage to the WTO and the multilateral world trad-
ing system through their trade policies: China by its 
disregard of the fundamental WTO principles of non-
discrimination and transparency, the United States 
through its repeated violations of core terms of the 
WTO treaty and not least through its punitive tariffs. 
The indifference of the world’s two largest trading 
powers towards the WTO rules casts a shadow over 
the organisation’s future viability and legitimacy as 
a multilateral system. The unappetising prospect is a 
gradual dissolution of the WTO trade framework 
through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
that are agreed, enforced and broken by virtue of 
arbitrary political power. A new trade world of that 
kind might offer some advantages to the United States 
and China as major political powers, but harm all the 
others. 
It is possible – if not in fact likely – that the 
struggle over techno-political spheres of influence 
will see the United States impose further sanctions 
and supplier boycotts against other Chinese compa-
nies and step up its pressure on third states to do 
the same.15 Companies in third states could soon find 
themselves facing the uncomfortable choice of doing 
business with either America or China. In the case of 
critical technologies this would create a world divided 
between Chinese and US standards and systems. 
European Union should 
defend the paradigm of 
rules-based multilateralism. 
The trade war could escalate into the financial 
markets, too. In August 2019 the US Treasury Depart-
ment accused China of currency manipulation after 
the renminbi had devalued significantly over the 
course of the year. If economic growth declines or 
even a recession develops, China and the United 
States (and other states) could be tempted to stimulate 
their domestic economies through currency devalua-
tion. More broadly, China’s threat to sell off all its 
US treasuries (worth more than $1 trillion) is still in 
the air, notwithstanding the harm China would do 
to itself. That would put America’s key interest rates 
 
15 On techno-political spheres of influence, see the con-
tribution by Matthias Schulze and Daniel Voelsen in this 
volume, pp. 30ff. 
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under severe pressure. Much more concrete are 
Beijing’s plans to introduce a digital currency that 
could challenge the international dominance of 
the US dollar (and the euro). Washington is in turn 
exploring ways to exclude Chinese businesses from 
the US financial markets and impose financial sanc-
tions against particular Chinese companies and 
individuals. 
Europe’s Positioning16 
As a result of the Sino-American conflict, world trade 
and the global division of labour are in retreat. Pro-
duction, income and innovation are suffering globally. 
The trade practices of America and China and the 
welfare losses caused by the conflict also affect Ger-
many and Europe, both directly and indirectly. China 
and the United States each threaten the European 
Union and European businesses with disadvantages 
if they fail to take the positions they respectively 
demand. 
Even if there are good foreign policy and security 
reasons why Europe cannot adopt a position of equi-
distance to America and China, the European Union 
should uphold its independent position in the trade 
disputes and defend the paradigm of rules-based 
multilateralism. In view of America’s and China’s 
breaches of rules and principles, partisanship would 
run counter to the principles of the European Single 
Market (non-discrimination, rules-orientation, multi-
lateralism). The European Union would only lose its 
credibility on trade policy vis-à-vis third countries. 
Europe’s negotiating position as honest broker be-
tween the adversaries would be unnecessarily weak-
ened. And even if it did take a side, the European 
Union would never be more than a junior partner 
whose own interests always come second. 
Orientation on liberal values and multilateral prin-
ciples is no obstacle to vigorous advocacy for Europe’s 
economic interests. Brussels must insist that future 
Sino-American trade agreements do not create dis-
criminatory disadvantages for the European Union. 
In the ongoing bilateral talks with the United States 
(about an agreement on trade and tariffs) and with 
China (about an investment agreement) the European 
Union must demand adequate concessions. And vis-à-
 
16 See also the conclusions on trade and regulatory policy 
in the contribution by Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert 
in this volume, pp. 45ff. 
vis China it will be necessary to expand the existing 
trade and investment defence instruments to ensure 
that European businesses no longer suffer disadvant-
ages from the activities of Chinese state-owned enter-
prises or excessive Chinese subsidies. Beyond this the 
European Union should invest in cooperation with 
like-minded trade partners, for example with Japan, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Australia and the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur). 
This could allow the European Union to strengthen 
its negotiating weight and hedge against systemic 
risks in world trade. 
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Both the United States and China regard technological 
superiority as a fundamental prerequisite for eco-
nomic and military strength and thus for their respec-
tive place in world politics. The United States still 
holds the leading position in numerous areas of tech-
nology. The Chinese government has explicitly stated 
its ambition to leave behind its past as the “workshop 
of the world” and take the lead in cutting-edge digital 
technologies within the coming years. As China in-
tensifies its pursuit of these objectives, a second – 
Chinese – technopolitical sphere of influence is 
emerging. This development creates new political 
challenges for those states that are technologically 
dependent on the United States – or increasingly 
also on China. 
Technopolitical Spheres of Influence 
In classical geopolitics the term sphere of influence 
is understood territorially, as a clearly defined area 
within which an actor exercises exclusive influence. 
Technopolitical spheres of influence differ from this 
on account of the characteristics of digital technolo-
gies. Firstly, digital products and services are based 
on various combinations of hardware and software, 
where no individual state and no single company is 
in any position to control all the levels of the tech-
nology stack. As a result, digital spheres of influence 
frequently overlap, for example when Chinese net-
work hardware is combined with an American operat-
ing system to run European applications. 
Secondly, many of the decisive digital technologies 
at issue here are subject to a network logic. National 
borders and territoriality are less significant in global 
communication networks like the internet; what mat-
ters, instead, is the centrality of the actors. Central 
network actors are able to control data flows and access 
to digital goods and services. They can thus exert eco-
nomic and political influence on other less central 
network actors, be these states or businesses. In this 
understanding, technopolitical spheres of influence 
are not necessarily exclusive. 
Digital spheres of influence follow a 
network logic. 
The United States has treated technological superi-
ority as an important element of national security 
since the 1940s. Initially, the Soviet Union was the 
greatest threat, joined in the 1980s by the rapid rise 
of the Japanese computer industry.1 During the first 
wave of digitisation in the 1990s, the United States 
was again in the lead and could thus secure a domi-
nant role in many core technologies of digitisation. 
Numerous states and businesses became dependent 
on market leaders from the United States (see figure 
1). Today, China is pursuing the twofold goal of first 
becoming independent from the United States in core 
digital technologies, and then disseminating its own 
technologies globally. That approach is articulated 
unambiguously in the “Made in China 2025” strat-
egy.2 One decisive instrument to achieve these goals is 
the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative, 
which underlines China’s ambition to create its own 
technopolitical sphere of influence as a counterweight 
to the American. The first successes of this strategy 
can be seen in the growing global importance of Chi-
nese firms operating social media platforms, provid-
ing cloud services and selling network technologies. 
The US sphere of influence has so far been de-
signed to enable as many states and companies as 
possible to use the products and services of American 
 
1 Mario Daniels, “Von ‘Paperclip’ zu CoCom: Die Heraus-
bildung einer neuen US-Technologie- und Wissenspolitik 
in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges (1941–1951)”, TG Technik-
geschichte 80, no. 3 (2013): 209–24. 
2 Max J. Zenglein and Anna Holzmann, Evolving Made in 
China 2025: China’s Industrial Policy in the Quest for Global Tech 
Leadership, Merics Papers on China 8 (Berlin: Mercator Insti-
tute for China Studies [Merics], July 2019), https://www. 
merics.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/MPOC_8_MadeinChina_ 
2025_final_3.pdf. 
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companies. In principle, the United States opens its 
markets to foreign firms, although it does also em-
ploy targeted instruments to restrict foreign invest-
ment and to control exports. China goes further in 
this respect: While the state supports the international 
activities of Chinese enterprises, it strictly regulates, 
and often limits, access to its own markets. 
The two spheres of influence overlap, especially 
in Europe, where numerous American and Chinese 
services are present. It is unclear how the spheres of 
influence will develop in future, for example whether 
the establishment of trade barriers may make them 
more closed and exclusive. The future development 
will depend on domestic factors and, more importantly, 
the future relationship between the two states. The 
more they regard their relationship as a zero-sum 
game the more likely it is that the struggle over tech-
nopolitical influence will intensify and lead to further 
conflicts. 
Technopolitical Spheres of Influence as a 
Means to Project Power 
Technological dependency is unproblematic as long 
as all parties involved see it as a desirable interde-
pendence that increases welfare. Matters become 
more tricky when central actors like the United States 
and China leverage dependencies to further their own 
egoistic interests. Spheres of influence provide these 
actors with distinct possibilities to exert political and 
Figure 1 
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economic influence over states and businesses that 
depend on them.3 
Firstly, central actors can define normative stand-
ards through their technologies, in a sense conducting 
a “politics by default”. Technologies are not value-
neutral, but always permeated by political ideas, 
values and norms.4 These become embedded in a 
technology as standard (“default”) configuration, 
for example in the software code, and as such create 
political and economic effects. Social networks like 
US-based Facebook and China’s WeChat are influ-
enced by both the values and the legal frameworks 
of their respective home countries, for example con-
cerning the limits of freedom of expression or the 
requirements concerning the protection of personal 
data protection. Amazon’s global logistics system and 
Uber’s mobility platform represent concrete expres-
sions of – in this case Anglo-Saxon – ideas about 
how economic competition should be organised. 
Through these platforms, their ideas and norms have 
disseminated across the globe. China in turn is at-
tempting to shape the economic affairs of other states 
with the global reach of, for instance, the Alibaba 
Group or the marketplace functions of WeChat. 
Path dependencies and lock-in effects play an im-
portant role here: If an actor becomes existentially 
dependent on the products of a central network actor 
because processes have been optimised for these prod-
ucts, it becomes very difficult and costly to switch. For 
example, almost all governments are dependent on 
the Microsoft Windows operating system (see figure 1, 
p. 31). In the case of network-based technologies like 
social media and online platforms (app stores and 
online marketplaces) the effect is amplified by net-
work effects and economies of scale. The stronger the 
associated path dependencies, the harder it becomes 
to deviate from the defaults set by digital services, 
or at least to limit their effects. Even in cases where 
actors share similar values, such as liberal democratic 
principles, this can lead to friction. The European 
Union’s long-running conflicts with American firms 
over their compliance with European data protection 
rules and labour rights in the so-called gig economy, 
represent a prominent example. 
 
3 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized 
Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape 
State Coercion”, International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79. 
4 See also the contribution on “Values and Orders” by 
Hanns Günther Hilpert in this volume, pp. 35ff. 
Digital spheres of influence enable 
“politics by default”. 
Secondly there is a power differential manifested in 
technopolitical spheres of influence. In the described 
network logic, actors in control of central nodes can 
manipulate the technologies upon which other states 
and businesses depend.5 This is glaringly obvious in 
the case of cyberespionage and surveillance. Many of 
the most important internet service providers such 
as Amazon, Google and Microsoft are based in the 
United States. That means that the data of their cus-
tomers outside the United States – in particular the 
users of cloud services – is often stored in US data 
centres. As Edward Snowden revealed, US intelligence 
services also exploit the fact that most of the world’s 
internet communication passes through servers and 
fibre-optic cables located in the United States, and can 
therefore be eavesdropped upon. Under court orders, 
security agencies can also access the cloud data of 
global enterprises stored in US-based data centres. 
These opportunities are not available to states that 
do not have such a central position. This regularly 
creates political conflicts, for example where Euro-
pean law enforcement authorities wish to access data 
in the United States for their investigations. 
China has responded to these developments by 
enhancing its own ability to monitor important fibre-
optic internet exchange points. Moreover, China, 
Russia and the European Union are seeking to repat-
riate their citizens’ data from the United States 
through various data localisation initiatives, as a step 
towards regaining control. China forces foreign com-
panies to store their customers’ data within Chinese 
territory, where the Chinese security authorities can 
access it. Recently this has even been expanded to en-
crypted communication by Western companies that 
use VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). 
Thirdly, technological dependency means that cen-
tral actors can use their power for acts of sabotage, 
disrupting or even preventing data flows or the avail-
ability of digital services in dependent states. This can 
include the simple denial of access to services hosted 
by central actors, restrictions on particular digital 
products in marketplaces (such as software in major 
app stores), the suspension of over-the-air software 
updates, or even the deliberate sabotage of IT systems. 
 
5 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strat-
egies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven and Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 2017). 
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An outage of Amazon web services or the major 
Google services, for example – whether through 
deliberate attack or accidental failure – would 
paralyse numerous European companies and web-
sites. The debate over the role of the Chinese tech-
nology company Huawei reflects the concerns of 
Western governments that China could sabotage the 
new 5G mobile networks. And with its restrictions 
on exports to Huawei, the United States also demon-
strates how production processes within a digital 
enterprise can be disrupted by interrupting global 
supply chains. 
Options for Third-Party States 
No other state can be expected to match the techno-
logical prowess of the United States and China in the 
foreseeable future. Both will attempt to expand their 
technopolitical influence. That is problematic for 
technologically dependent states, as the economic 
pressure grows and their political space shrinks. 
Essentially, third-party states have the following three 
options: 
Firstly, they can join either China or the United 
States and place their faith fully in the technologies 
of one of the two spheres of influence. That would 
increase their dependency in one direction but not 
the other. Although this restricts their overall leeway, 
it also creates possibilities for influence within the 
relationship. One example of this is the close coopera-
tion between the intelligence services of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand (“Five Eyes”), specifically with regard to 
technological methods of espionage; indications of 
closer technological cooperation between Russia and 
China are open to the same interpretation.6 
Secondly, states can make greater strategic use 
of existing interdependencies by choosing deliber-
ately and selectively to rely on technologies from 
both spheres of influence. For Europe, where the two 
spheres already overlap, this route is the most likely. 
But in order for this bi-directional interdependence 
to become truly strategic, Europe needs to review its 
actual dependencies and decide which are acceptable, 
 
6 Samuel Bendett and Elsa B. Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-
tech Partnership, Policy Brief, Report no. 22/2019 (Barton: Aus-
tralian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2019), https://www. 
aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership 
(accessed 19 December 2019). 
and which are not. On this basis it must then consider 
how dependency in core digital technologies can be 
compensated by strengths in other economic sectors.7 
Although Europe may be largely dependent on the 
United States and China for digital technologies, the 
latter rely on European skills and expertise in other 
sectors, for example chemical and medical research 
and industrial manufacturing technologies. In times 
of escalating political conflict, the European Union 
could use this as a “bargaining chip”. Beyond this, a 
strategic policy could try to shape the interdepend-
ence in such a way that it lies in the interests of both 
sides to avoid escalation, conflicts and certainly the 
breaking off of relations. 
The attractiveness of the European Single Market 
is a source of political power. The European General 
Data Protection Regulation provides an illuminating 
example. Because the Single Market is so important to 
American IT businesses, Europe has been able to force 
them to adopt stricter data protection practices. A 
similar effect was seen in the past with EU anti-trust 
cases against internet giants like Google and Microsoft 
that had abused their quasi-monopoly position. 
If the confrontation between the two spheres 
intensifies, strategic interdependence generates more 
friction and pressure. Today both the United States 
and China are exerting strong pressure on third states 
like Germany over the Huawei issue, and further con-
flicts over digital technologies must be expected. These 
include technology for intelligent traffic manage-
ment, smart cities (where China has a pilot project in 
Duisburg) and smart grids. 
Thirdly, states can attempt to disentangle depend-
encies. The basic version of this is to reduce depend-
ency in individual technology sectors. In terms of 
political practice, Estonia is probably the country that 
has gone furthest down this road. Almost all of its 
public administration relies on locally developed 
digital technologies. Russia has also been working for 
some time to become more autonomous by establish-
ing its own equivalents to dominant US services like 
Google (Yandex) and Facebook (vKontakte). The plan 
to place Russia’s entire internet infrastructure under 
state control is also driven by the idea of escaping 
dependency on the United States. 
A more comprehensive version is to develop home-
grown alternatives for all key technologies and to 
begin creating one’s own technopolitical sphere of in-
 
7 See also the contribution on “Trade, Economy and 
Finance” by Hanns Günther Hilpert in this volume, pp. 25ff. 
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fluence. This option requires considerable financial 
expense. In high-tech fields such as semiconductor 
manufacturing or quantum computing a country 
might have to invest billions over several decades in 
order to develop its own viable alternatives. Because 
of the aforementioned network effects and strategic 
market restrictions it will also be considerably more 
difficult for latecomers to catch up in digital tech-
nologies. If Europe wanted to establish its own third 
technopolitical sphere of influence, however, this 
would be required. 
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The Sino-American conflict of values is embedded in 
the broader ideological conflict between the demo-
cratic market economies of the West on the one side 
and the state capitalist systems on the other. The 
United States and China are the protagonists, but 
Europe and Russia also play important independent 
roles of their own. What the Sino-American conflict 
of values is not, is a rerun of the ideological confron-
tation of the Cold War: secular ideologies no longer 
possess the significance they did during the East/West 
conflict. The age where worldviews served as motor 
and motivator of great power conflicts is over. At 
most, the different ideas about values and order ad-
vocated by China and the West serve the purpose of 
internally creating identity and legitimising power 
and externally backing up each side’s own soft power. 
Certainly the differences in terms of values and 
order are less clear-cut in the new Sino-American con-
flict of values. China is politically and economically 
integrated in the Western-inspired international sys-
tem and does not flaunt itself as a systemic alter-
native. And the US Administration under President 
Donald Trump no longer sees itself – in a break with 
America’s post-1945 foreign policy tradition – as the 
guardian of a liberal world order, but first and fore-
most as the defender of American interests. Although 
it is possible and even probable that future US Ad-
ministrations will reclaim a normative and order-
defining leadership role, it is currently Europe that 
has in the first place assumed the role of protecting 
liberal Western values and the rules-based multi-
lateral order. Although a hard ideological fight com-
parable to the Cold War has not to date occurred, 
both sides do sling normatively charged accusations 
at each other. 
The different world views of China and the West 
concerning political order and principles represent 
a challenge for both sides, but for China certainly a 
larger one than for the United States. China fears for 
the survival and existence of its own system and for 
the power of the party, which asserts it is the only 
force capable of averting chaos, separatism and 
demise. America and the West worry on the other 
hand “only” over the possibility of losing their inter-
pretative dominance of international politics, in-
directly also over the stability of the multilateral 
institutions that were established in the liberal spirit 
of the West. In terms of power politics what the 
United States wants is to preserve its global supremacy, 
also in the sphere of soft power. 
The West’s Liberal Ideas as Threat to 
the Chinese Communist Party’s Claim 
to Power 
Despite the many manifestations of erosion, liberal 
Western values likely continue to exert a great fas-
cination on Chinese intellectuals and society and 
possess great appeal – even if there is no reliable 
empirical research on this. The calls for reforms in 
spring 1989 were Western-inspired, those who raised 
them were brutally cut down and silenced on Tianan-
men Square. Charter 08 was also orientated on West-
ern values; Liu Xiaobo, recipient of the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize, played a central role in drafting it. Its 
central demands are: observance of human rights, 
legislative democracy, division of powers, independ-
ence of the judiciary and protection of private prop-
erty. For China, Western values constitute a real 
alternative system. Liberal ideas and principles have 
already been successfully implemented in the Chi-
nese states and entities of Singapore, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Currently the student movement in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is de-
fending them vehemently against political assault 
from China. 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
Values and Orders: 
Ideological Conflicts and Challenges 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
SWP Berlin 
Strategic Rivalry between United States and China 
April 2020 
36 
Party and state in China identify 
liberal universalism as a 
subversive challenge. 
Although China currently need not fear a colour 
revolution, not least on account of its stunningly 
successful economic development, the ruling party 
and state have certainly identified the liberal world 
view and its claim to universality as a subversive 
challenge. The system responds to threats to its own 
claim to power with repression, propaganda and 
censorship. Political dissent and regional autonomy 
strivings are decisively rejected, in some cases by 
repressive means including imprisonment and re-
education. Religions like Christianity and Islam are 
forced to Sinicise their symbolism, liturgy and lan-
guage. Since 2018 the work of domestic and foreign 
NGOs has been subject to sweeping legal and ad-
ministrative restrictions. It is practically impossible to 
use foreign-controlled social networks like Facebook, 
Twitter and Google in China. A school and textbook 
reform realised in stages between 2004 and 2010 now 
propagates less favourable views of Western democ-
racy and liberal capitalism.1 State-controlled media 
dismiss the Western democracies – especially the 
American one – as dysfunctional while trumpeting 
China’s economic, social and political progress.2 
China’s “Great Firewall” permits extensive censorship 
of the internet, with IP range bans preventing access 
to particular websites. Content filtering of keywords 
blocks access to information the regime wishes to 
suppress. About fifty thousand censors monitor dis-
cussions in chatrooms and social networks and inter-
vene wherever individual complaints appear to be 
coalescing into collective dissatisfaction. 
Abroad too, China also vigorously defends its 
power and interests. The goal is pro-China media 
coverage – and policy – in foreign countries. The 
international presence of Chinese state media has 
visibly expanded (newspapers and international pro-
gramming from China Global Television Networks, 
CGTN). Less well known is the mobilisation of the 
roughly sixty million ethnic Chinese living abroad – 
 
1 For an empirical study, see Davide Cantoni, Yuyu Chen, 
David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman and Y. Jane Zhang, “Curricu-
lum and Ideology”, Journal of Political Economy 125, no. 2 
(2017): 338–92. 
2 For the first five years of Xi Jinping’s presidency (2013–
2017), see Emily S. Chen, Is China Challenging the Global State of 
Democracy? Issues & Insights, vol. 19, WP 5 (Honolulu: Pacific 
Forum, June 2019), 3f. 
regardless of their citizenship – for China’s positions 
and interests in the scope of a sophisticated diaspora 
policy.3 Important channels for expanding influence 
abroad include the Confucius Institutes and the Chi-
nese Students’ and Scholars’ Association. Pressure is 
occasionally placed on foreign companies operating 
in China, for example to show Taiwan as part of 
China on maps (United Airways, Christian Dior), to 
remove politically sensitive images from advertising 
(Daimler, Leica), to keep staff who participated in the 
demonstrations in Hong Kong off flights to China 
(Cathay Pacific), or to avoid critical political state-
ments (National Basketball Association). Decision-
makers abroad are influenced by means of a broad 
spectrum of instruments, beginning with attractive 
invitations to China and the intermediation of lucra-
tive business deals but also including intimidation, 
bribery and blackmail.4 
China’s New Paradigms for 
International Cooperation 
Although vague in substance and indeterminate in its 
objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiated 
by President Xi Jinping reveals the contours of a new 
Sinocentric world order. In fact, though, the Chinese 
see the BRI not as a counter-model to the West’s global 
order but a necessary complement. It is intended to 
secure and guarantee markets and resources in an 
international environment that is politically stable 
and China-friendly. It should also enable open, flex-
ible and inclusive cooperation with foreign countries 
in the scope of economic, political and cultural net-
works. In bilateral and multilateral contexts China 
vigorously presses for international political recogni-
 
3 On China’s diaspora politics, see Carsten Schäfer, 
“‘The Body Overseas, But the Heart Remains in China’? – 
China’s Diaspora Politics and Its Implications”, Border 
Crossing, 9 (2019) 1, 29–42. 
4 “How China’s ‘Sharp Power’ Is Muting Criticism Abroad”, 
Economist, 14 December 2017; Anne-Marie Brady, Magic Weap-
ons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping, paper 
presented at the Conference on “The Corrosion of Democracy 
under China’s Global Influence”, supported by the Taiwan 
Foundation for Democracy, Arlington, Virginia, 16–17 
September 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/for_website_magicweaponsanne-mariesbradyseptember 
2017.pdf (accessed 24 October 2019); Jessica Chen Weiss, 
“A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of 
Global Politics”, Foreign Affairs 98, no. 4 (2019): 92–102 (98f.). 
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tion of the BRI. The objective of the BRI is not to sup-
plant Western ideas and institutions; after all, rising 
China has profited enormously from the stability and 
openness of the Western system. But the end of that 
journey could be a new world order inspired by Chi-
nese civilisation into which the existing multilateral 
institutions would then be incorporated. Indeed Chi-
nese universalism is based not on values and norms, 
but on the conviction that Chinese civilisation – 
rooted in Confucian morality – is superior to all 
others.5 
China may not be working actively to supersede 
the Western system, but that does not mean it has 
become a stakeholder either. On the contrary, given 
the opportunity China has no qualms over measures 
and policies that undermine the Western order or 
delegitimise multilateral institutions. Two examples: 
China refused to recognise the 2016 ruling of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in its 
dispute with the Philippines; it also flouts fundamen-
tal principles of the World Trade Organisation, such 
as non-discrimination and transparency. Other prob-
lems include China’s support for repressive regimes 
with loans, investment, arms, surveillance technology 
and in some cases a veto in the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, as well as the de facto undermining of 
constitutional and civil society structures in the 
course of commercial engagement abroad. But China 
strictly observes the principle of non-interference and 
refrains from actively promoting authoritarian 
regimes.6 
China’s symbiosis of growth and 
stability offers developing countries 
and emerging economies an 
alternative to the Western model. 
More critical (from the Western perspective) than 
China’s ambivalent diplomacy and foreign policy 
is the exemplary nature of its transformation and 
modernisation process. For developing countries and 
emerging economies, and especially their ruling elites, 
China’s successful symbiosis of economic growth and 
 
5 For a comprehensive survey of the BRI, see Nadine Gode-
hardt, No End of History: A Chinese Alternative Concept of Inter-
national Order? SWP Research Paper 2/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016); Bruno Maçães, Belt 
and Road: A Chinese World Order (London, 2018). 
6 Also Chen, Is China Challenging the Global State of Democracy? 
(see note 2); Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy?” (see note 4), 
95–102. 
authoritarian political stability represents an attrac-
tive alternative to the Western model. The Chinese 
example shows how development on the basis of 
given local circumstances is possible – but also how 
repression creates internal political stability, how 
societies can be prevented from forming a critical 
public sphere and how nationalism can be used to 
consolidate power in a system. China shows state 
leaders and developments planners in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America very clearly that economic pro-
gress and globalisation must not necessarily rely on 
the Western paradigm.7 
Facing a New Systemic Competitor? 
China’s seemingly unstoppable economic rise has 
shaken the West’s self-image of its democratic market 
economy as the most successful and humane system. 
Even if China might be a special case on account of 
its size, dynamism and culture, its development does 
demonstrate that a combination of authoritarian rule 
and oligarchical capitalism not only functions but can 
also produce outstanding results in terms of income 
and productivity growth, political stability and inter-
national status.8 Moreover this realisation hits a West 
that is experiencing growing doubts about its own 
ability to generate growth, innovation and prosperity, 
at a time where stagnating wages, social inequality, 
climate change and technological transformation 
cloud the prospects of creating a positive, hopeful 
future for the people. The West is also having to deal 
with a situation where its own leading power, the 
United States, is consistently undermining the nor-
mative foundations of the liberal order in its actions 
at home and abroad. 
China contradicts – at least provisionally – the 
widely shared liberal expectation that growing pros-
perity will automatically bring in its wake a political 
liberalisation towards democracy, pluralism and rule 
of law. In China the opposite appears to be the case: 
successful economic development has strengthened 
 
7 Michael Hüther, Matthias Diermeier and Henry Goecke, 
Die erschöpfte Globalisierung: Zwischen transatlantischer Orientie-
rung und chinesischem Weg (Wiesbaden, 2018); Dan Banik and 
Benedicte Bull, “Chinese Engagement in Africa and Latin 
America: Does It Matter for State Capacity?”, Third World 
Thematics: A TWQ Journal 3, no. 4 (2018): 532–51. 
8 C. Fred Bergsten, China and the United States (see note 6); 
Hüther, Diermeier and Goecke, Die erschöpfte Globalisierung 
(see note 7). 
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the power vertical and forms a narrative component 
of identity-building Chinese nationalism. The party, 
the state and society are undergoing a phase of ideo-
logisation, disciplining and caderisation. China’s 
authoritarian state capitalism has become a powerful 
alternative to the democratic capitalist societies of the 
West. But where China is going, and how, remains 
uncertain. On the one hand it is conceivable that the 
regime can reinforce its resilience by employing digi-
talisation to efficiently expand its social control and 
minimise the systematic deficits of state economic 
planning. On the other, China could be brought 
crashing down by the consequences of its dysfunc-
tional policies, if it fails to get a grip on the problems 
created by internal debt, industrial overcapacity, 
growing inequality, pollution and corruption. The 
result would be a systemic crisis.9 
Germany and Europe must 
take systemic competition with 
China seriously. 
In conclusion, the trajectory and outcome of the 
systemic competition between China and the West 
are fundamentally open. It cannot be excluded that 
two different systems can be compatible and coexist 
in a networked global economy – but it is unlikely. 
In the long run, it is more likely that one system will 
prevail or even displace the other. The systemic com-
petition with China is definitely of great relevance. 
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in uphold-
ing their liberal values internally and preserving a 
liberal order internationally. In the fields of foreign 
policy and external economic policy, Germany and 
Europe cannot regard the systemic competition with 
China as a trivial matter of opinion. Instead they 
must place European values and interests where they 
belong – front and centre in relations with China. 
 
9 George Magnus, Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Heribert Dieter, 
Chinas Verschuldung und seine Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen: Peking 
exportiert ein gefährliches Modell, SWP-Studie 18/2019 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019). 
 Trump and Xi: Clash of Leadership Styles 
 SWP Berlin 
 Strategic Rivalry between United States and China 
 April 2020 
 39 
The strong personalisation of Chinese and American 
politics in the era of Xi and Trump shapes relations 
between the two states. Nor are third states untouched 
by Xi’s and Trump’s leadership styles, whether in 
the sense of having to deal with the repercussions or 
through the temptation to emulate them. The influ-
ence of individual decision-makers and their leader-
ship styles is a decisive factor for the orientation of 
foreign policy activities.1 The same applies to assess-
ments of prospects of success, acceptance among 
supporters and chances of realisation in the interna-
tional sphere. Especially in presidential political sys-
tems, the leadership ability and style of the head of 
state are crucial for managing processes of change 
and gaining new supporters. An examination of 
leadership styles therefore provides insights into 
the dynamics of governance.2 
The presidents of China and the United States have 
redefined the field of foreign policy, both in the in-
ternal structures of their states and in their external 
relations. In the United States President Trump has 
minimised the influence of the State Department, in 
China the Communist Party under President Xi has 
taken control of foreign policy decisions. The pro-
cesses of both international politics and domestic 
power resources are strongly determined by the dif-
ferent leadership styles of the two presidents. By 
centralising the structures of the Communist Party Xi 
has stopped the outflow of political decision-making 
power to bureaucratic instances and counteracted the 
 
1 On this, see Michael Foley, “Doing Leadership: Types, 
Styles, and Contingency”, in idem, Political Leadership: Themes, 
Contexts, and Critiques (Oxford, 2013), 31–57 (50ff.); and 
Thomas Preston, Leadership and Foreign Policy Analysis, 
in Oxford Research Encyclopedia, International Studies (December 
2017), https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/ 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190846626-e-255 (accessed 3 December 2019). 
2 Corresponding analyses are also conducted under the 
title “Operational Code”. In the case of China the problematic 
situation with sources makes such investigations very 
difficult. 
erosion of political control capacity. Trump has estab-
lished direct relationships with his base by bypassing 
the structures of the Republican Party apparatus 
and creating a personal “fan club”. But the leadership 
styles of the two presidents cannot be explained 
solely in terms of their respective character traits. 
They also depend on the way presidential power is 
embedded in the institutional contexts of the respec-
tive systems of government. 
Donald Trump’s Transactional 
Leadership Style3 
US President Trump presents himself as a “deal-maker”, 
a “hard negotiator” who trusts his own negotiating 
skills more than those of the diplomatic corps. He 
pulls out all the stops in pursuit of the self-aggran-
disement he flaunts above all for his followers at 
home. In such a “transactional” approach to foreign 
policy, the mixing of political agendas makes every-
thing “negotiable”. 
Personal arrangements and rituals of 
reciprocal recognition supplant 
treaties between states. 
Here personal arrangements with other heads 
of state and rituals of mutual recognition supplant 
treaties and agreements between states and minis-
tries.4 The method depends on transversal linkage of 
all possible policy areas in order to generate political 
 
3 Bernard M. Bass, “From Transactional to Transformation-
al Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision”, Organizational 
Dynamics 18, no. 3 (1990): 19–31. 
4 This is also described as a “patronalistic modus operan-
di”; see Reinhard Wolf, “Eingebildete Missachtung, Narziss-
mus und patronalistisches Denken: Die Wurzeln von Donald 
Trumps Aversion gegen die liberale Weltordnung”, in Angriff 
auf die liberale Weltordnung: Die amerikanische Außen- und Sicher-
heitspolitik unter Donald Trump, ed. Christopher Daase and 
Stefan Kroll (Wiesbaden, 2019), 39–58 (50). 
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pressure and demonstrate personal autonomy of 
action. Where the inherent logic of individual policy 
areas is ignored or sight is lost of the associated side-
effects, tried and tested corridors of action become 
closed off. Trump’s leadership style therefore reflects 
all the contradictions of the heterogeneous expecta-
tions placed upon his behaviour, which he must fulfil 
in domestic politics and vis-à-vis his supporters. The 
diplomatic apparatus has little chance of moderating 
this, still less correcting. 
Xi Jinping’s Transformative 
Leadership Style 
By carrying through an extreme centralisation of the 
foreign policy apparatus, the Chinese head of state 
has succeeded in melding institutional action with 
personal power.5 Xi presents himself as the “chair-
man of everything” at home and abroad, securing 
this role by seeking and finding strong support in 
the party and government hierarchies.6 By virtue of 
his central position in both party and state Xi holds 
all the cards.7 He took control of the field of foreign 
policy by establishing the Central Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party and placing it under his authority. Xi’s 
streamlining of the government and party apparatus-
es represents part of the process by which the Chinese 
system has transitioned from a fragmented form of 
authoritarianism to an autocratic one.8 Xi Jinping’s 
leadership style and cult of personality can be de-
scribed as “transformative”. This applies not only to 
his domestic power base, which Xi has strengthened 
in the course of the party reform and the associated 
 
5 Sebastian Heilmann, “Introduction: China’s Core Execu-
tive: Leadership Styles, Structures and Processes under Xi 
Jinping”, in China’s Core Executive. Leadership Styles, Structures 
and Processes under Xi Jinping, ed. Sebastian Heilmann and 
Matthias Stepan, Merics Papers on China 1 (Berlin: Mercator 
Institute for China Studies [Merics], June 2016), 6–10 (8). 
6 See the summary in “Xi Jinping’s Leadership: Chair-
man of Everything”, Economist, 2 April 2016, https://www. 
economist.com/china/2016/04/02/chairman-of-everything. 
7 Weixing Hu, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: 
The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy Transformation”, 
Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 115 (2019): 1–14. 
8 Heilmann, “Introduction: China’s Core Executive” 
(see note 5), 10. 
shift from collective to personalistic leadership.9 The 
transformative aspect is also visible externally: The 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established an overarch-
ing global narrative that supports China’s claim to an 
outstanding role, under which many actors that have 
to date operated only nationally are now expected to 
operate internationally. The BRI is perceived in inter-
national politics as a “grand strategy” and has had 
the effect of causing numerous actors to orientate on 
China. Even in dealings with regional neighbours in 
East and South-East Asia, Xi has chosen a risk-taking 
style of diplomacy dedicated primarily to achieving 
China’s objectives. 
Collision of Leadership Styles: 
Loss of Trust and Compliance 
With their different leadership styles, Trump and Xi 
are plainly and increasingly turning out to be incom-
patible. From the Chinese leadership’s perspective 
Trump is personally unreliable and largely unpredict-
able. In the eyes of the White House Xi’s leadership 
style confirms existing reservations, with his great 
concentration of power, strong internal control, an 
economic trajectory perceived as expansionist, and 
the corresponding strategic narrative. In view of the 
centralisation and personalisation of power in the 
field of foreign policy, the specific styles of leadership 
determine which corridors of action are open to the 
actors, under consideration of the institutional and 
political circumstances. The clash of the two leader-
ship styles implies high costs to generate and preserve 
mutual trust. 
The logic of the kind of “transactional leadership” 
Trump adopts rests largely on an understanding that 
in a situation of mutual dependency, a relationship of 
recognition and trust requires a (not necessarily sym-
metrical) exchange of positions in order to reach an 
understanding. Here norms, standards and principles 
are relatively marginal. What is more important is 
to select situational responses that are regarded as 
appropriate where particular goals and interests are 
being pursued. In this leadership style the stability 
of a relationship is valued less highly than short-term 
positional gains.10 The substance of “the deal” re-
 
9 Susan L. Shirk, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: The Return to Per-
sonalistic Rule”, Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 22–36. 
10 Wolf, “Eingebildete Missachtung, Narzissmus und patro-
nalistisches Denken” (see note 4), 46. 
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mains largely open and negotiable. But if compliance 
between the two sides is weak – in the sense of the 
expectation that the other side will actually imple-
ment agreements that have been reached, for exam-
ple in the trade sector – it is impossible to develop 
a viable relationship. If the actors tend – sometimes 
for domestic political reasons – to overload the rela-
tionship with issues from other policy areas, such as 
the North Korea problem, this directly endangers the 
entire relationship model. This injects uncertainty 
into the realisation of achieved agreements and calls 
their durability into question. It is also a challenge to 
consolidate agreements that are heavily characterised 
by personalised leadership styles and at the same 
time to take into account the interests and reserva-
tions of institutional actors such as the Senate and 
State Department (to include them and their positions 
in formulating “the deal”). 
By contrast the “transformational leadership” rep-
resented by Xi’s leadership style offers the opportunity 
to generate a degree of long-term engagement and 
commitment – above and beyond specific agree-
ments – through a strategic narrative like “Belt and 
Road”, which is capable of fostering permanent rela-
tionships between states. This applies not only to the 
United States and China, but also to third states, as 
the latter are included in the logic of the narrative 
and subject to its imperatives. But that can also have 
negative consequences. In the perception of partners 
the narrative is closely tied to a leader whose position 
has been strengthened by a concentration of power. 
For this reason it also supports the assumption that 
China is seeking sweeping hegemony and to that end 
exerting influence or pressure on decisive societal 
forces in the prospective partner countries. Rigid in-
ternal procedures aiming to secure party control also 
harm external relations by disincentivising coopera-
tion. At the same time the United States fears that 
China might be harbouring expansionist intentions. 
The consequence of this is that all concrete agree-
ments are immediately interpreted in a different 
light, as in the case of Huawei. This erodes mutual 
predictability and removes the basis of trust. 
Competition of Leadership Styles 
The ramifications of the contrasting leadership styles 
are visible both in the direct relationship between 
Trump and Xi and in their relationships with third 
states. There is no lack of evidence showing how 
Trump has instrumentalised foreign policy issues for 
domestic political ends, one example being his plan 
to build a wall on the Mexican border to stem migra-
tion and violence. China has also been affected by 
this approach to politics, where the US President 
called China a “currency manipulator” and “rule 
breaker” (in relation to both trade rules and intellec-
tual property rights). Trump sees China both as a 
strategic adversary on trade questions and as a useful 
factor in specific situations like North Korea. But 
the decisive yardstick is always US domestic politics. 
China is regarded as a “revisionist power”, as a “rival” 
seeking to “shape a world antithetical to US values 
and interests” – to displace the United States and 
restructure the world order.11 
With this thrust Trump is pursuing an approach 
that is strongly oriented on bilateral relationships 
and tailored to the concept of “deal making”. Trump 
makes agreements contingent on his personal esteem 
for his counterpart. This underlines the – politically 
desired – rejection of multilateral formats, in which 
the President tends to participate only reluctantly. His 
uninhibited style of communication and the strongly 
emotional appeal of his politics are incompatible 
with Chinese etiquette and create disconcertion in 
the Beijing leadership – especially when China finds 
itself dragged into US election campaigns. From the 
Chinese perspective this is disrespectful both to the 
customs of international relations and personally 
towards Xi. 
Xi’s foreign policy activism signalises 
a clear change of course. 
All these elements are regarded as “anti-diplomatic 
behaviour”, not only because Trump rejects diplomatic 
forms and niceties, but also because he presents his 
positions in a confrontative manner interspersed 
with threats. His attempts to force compliance through 
(trade) sanctions must inevitably elicit a harsh re-
sponse from his Chinese opposite number because 
they violate the fundamental principles of status rec-
ognition and respect in Chinese foreign policy and 
self-image. Trump’s aversion to multilateralism is in 
accordance with his transactional approach, which is 
orientated on straightforward bilateral relationship 
 
11 As formulated in the National Security Strategy, see 
“Trump Labels China a Strategic ‘Competitor’”, Financial 
Times, 18 December 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/ 
215cf8fa-e3cb-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec. 
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models. Trump’s predilection for top-down solutions 
thus also fits with his emphatic rejection of bureau-
cratic coordination processes, which boosts his cred-
ibility among his supporters. 
Unlike his immediate predecessor Hu Jintao, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping is willing to take certain risks in inter-
national relations, even if this involves standing up to 
the United States. Channelling the national confidence 
he himself propagates, Xi’s foreign policy activism and 
intense interactions with other states signalise a clear 
change of course from that of his predecessor.12 The 
growing “hard balancing”, as pursued in maritime 
and territorial questions by certain states in the closer 
neighbourhood – including Japan – tests China’s 
rhetoric of partnership and cooperation. But it changes 
nothing in Xi’s maxim that his foreign policy should 
first and foremost serve core national interests.13 His 
“major country diplomacy with Chinese characteris-
tics” departs from past doctrines of a cautious and 
almost “invisible” foreign policy and instead posits a 
clear leadership role for China including a greater say 
in international affairs.14 Mutual respect is the central 
value – especially in the relationship with the United 
States – in relation both to territorial integrity and to 
recognition of different development models. China 
under Xi expects its own importance to be adequately 
acknowledged. Xi desires greater visibility and en-
hanced international status for his country – and for 
himself. This shift is underlined by China’s presence 
on the multilateral stage and in multilateral organi-
sations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (BRICS 
Bank). Xi’s personal relationship with his American 
counterpart is secondary to the desire for concrete 
improvements for his country.15 This is the absolute 
opposite of Trump’s approach, where good personal 
 
12 Heilmann, “Introduction: China’s Core Executive” 
(see note 5), 9. 
13 Kerry Brown, “Expanding China’s Global Reach: Stra-
tegic Priorities under Xi Jinping – the Link between the 
Outside and Within, and the Story of the Three Zones”, in 
China’s Core Executive, ed. Heilmann and Stepan (see note 5), 
26–31. 
14 Kishan S. Rana, “China’s Foreign Ministry: Fit for Pur-
pose in the Era of Xi Jinping, BRI and ‘Major Country Diplo-
macy with Chinese Characteristics’?” China Report 55, no. 3 
(2019): 193–218. 
15 Yevgen Sautin, “A ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’ 
Revisited”, in China’s “New Era” with Xi Jinping Characteristics, 
China Analysis (London: European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions [ECFR], December 2017), 7ff. (8). 
relations are the precondition for working through 
the long list of problems on the bilateral agenda. Xi’s 
leadership by contrast relies on a “highly scripted 
style”,16 from which one does not deviate on account 
of personal relationships. Although the strategic 
competition is cast in the form of “consultation and 
cooperation” in the sense of close partnership, it is 
driven by the unspoken model character that China 
claims for itself.17 
Strategic Competition 
The collision of leadership styles is part and parcel 
of the strategic competition. The person-centredness 
of foreign policy action and formal authority deter-
mine the leadership style applied. The clash of these 
contrary styles not only creates or deepens conflicts 
in the direct relationship, but also erodes the basis 
of trust between the affected states. This may even 
create openings for third states, and opportunities for 
gains if they seek a balance between the leadership 
styles and their protagonists. This competition of 
leadership styles creates a disadvantageous context 
that makes it difficult to find viable solutions for 
overarching issues and global problems, for example 
in climate protection or arms control. 
The European Union clearly favours multilateral 
formats for order and cooperation. These demand 
investment and preparation if they are to prevent 
Trump’s unilateralism or compensate his lack of con-
sideration for alliance interests. Moreover Europe has 
only limited ability to bilaterally contain the status 
conflicts between the United States and China that 
have sharpened with the end of the collective leader-
ship model in China and the ensuing concentration 
of power in Xi’s hands. The reason for this is that 
both countries, as the Huawei case demonstrates, 
immediately slot such status conflicts into the con-
flict-laden bilateral relationship model. 
 
 
16 Jane Perlez, “Trump and Xi: Two Imposing Leaders with 
Clashing Agendas”, New York Times, 6 April 2017. 
17 Sautin, “A ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’ Revis-
ited” (see note 15), 9. 
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The dawn of the 2020s finds the multilateral order 
in crisis, as China’s rise to become a great economic, 
political and military power collides with the rise 
of “America First” politics in the United States. The 
greatest political challenges of our time involve trans-
national phenomena, including climate change, 
inequality and pandemics.1 Yet at a time when one 
would hope for cooperation in international organi-
sations to shift up a gear, we witness instead that 
multilateral organizations are paralysed. The idea of 
taking the development of existing institutions and 
rulebooks up a level is almost inconceivable. China 
under President Xi Jinping presents itself as the cham-
pion of multilateralism, but in reality subverts the 
work of multilateral institutions. At the same time 
US President Donald Trump threatens to withdraw 
from multilateral organisations, alternating between 
declaring them useless and complaining that they are 
hostile and anti-American. Both states undermine the 
global order in their own way by flouting multilateral 
rules and abusing institutions for displays of power. 
Growing Rivalry between Beijing and 
Washington 
Washington has had a sceptical eye on China’s eco-
nomic rise for some time. After the global financial 
crisis of 2008 American decision-makers grew increas-
ingly concerned that China’s enormous economic 
success would create a geopolitical challenge. It was 
Washington’s willingness to lead the process of estab-
lishing and running the international order and 
the ability to bear significant financial burdens that 
 
1 John Ikenberry, “American Leadership May Be in Crisis, 
but the World Order Is Not”, Washington Post, 27 January 
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2016/01/27/american-leadership-is-in-crisis-but-the-
world-order-is-not/ (accessed 16 December 2019). 
formed the basis for America’s almost unchallenged 
dominance of the multilateral organisations since the 
Second World War. 
Until the financial crisis the United 
States dominated the multilateral 
organisations almost unchallenged. 
The financial crisis marked a turning point where 
the costs to the public budget restricted Washington’s 
ability to maintain its dominance in central multi-
lateral organisations. Although Barack Obama’s Ad-
ministration continued to support the international 
institutions and threw its weight behind multilateral 
conflict-resolution processes, it also significantly 
pared back its financial commitments, above all 
under pressure from Congress.2 At the same time 
China, which emerged from the financial crisis largely 
unscathed, poured massive fiscal resources into ex-
panding its influence in multilateral organisations. 
From Washington’s perspective – and that of the rest 
of the West – the global geostrategic centre of gravity 
has followed the economic east to Asia, above all 
China, during the past decade. Among the areas of 
the global multilateral order displaying the growing 
rivalry between the United States and China, two 
stand out: firstly, the Bretton Woods institutions 
(World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and 
the World Trade Organisation, which promote co-
operation on economic, financial and monetary 
policy; and secondly the United Nations. 
 
2 Josh Rogin, “Obama Cuts Foreign Assistance to Several 
Countries in New Budget Request”, Foreign Policy Online, 14 
February 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/14/obama-
cuts-foreign-assistance-to-several-countries-in-new-budget-
request/ (accessed 10 March 2020); “Obama’s ‘Smart Power’ 
Plan Risks Death of 1,000 Cuts”, Reuters, 7 September 2011, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-power/obamas-
smart-power-plan-risks-death-of-1000-cuts-idUSTRE78613G 
20110907 (accessed 10 March 2020). 
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The Bretton Woods Institutions and the 
US-China Conflict 
Under the surface of the visible trade dispute between 
the United States and China lurks a conflict over par-
ticipation in global decision-making, whose origins 
date back to the early 2000s. That is when China 
began demanding a larger say, commensurate to its 
economic importance, within the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions. But the United States, supported by the 
other G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of 
China’s influence in the IMF and the World Bank. 
China responded by employing its enormous re-
sources to found new formats and organisations, 
which it dominates as the largest single donor. This 
applies above all to the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank 
(formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) 
and the Belt and Road Initiative. 
At the same time, China has declined to obey a 
number of important trade rules ever since it joined 
the WTO in 2001. To this day some of the reforms 
promised in its accession protocol remain unimple-
mented, above all in the areas of market opening, 
market-distorting subsidies and protection of intel-
lectual property. Unlike his predecessor Obama who 
maintained the multilateral rules while criticising 
China’s neo-mercantilist economic policy, President 
Trump set a different course from day one. His Admin-
istration demanded that China implement reforms 
that would have completely upended its economic 
model. The United States – along with the European 
Union, Japan and Canada – accuse China of system-
atic theft of intellectual property and complain about 
competition-distorting requirements placed on West-
ern companies in the Chinese market. But rather than 
conducting its economic conflict with China within 
the multilateral WTO framework, the Trump Admin-
istration actively weakens it in two ways. 
Firstly, Washington itself overrides the agreed 
multilateral rules of the WTO by imposing compre-
hensive unilateral import tariffs on steel and alumin-
ium and threatening further protectionist tariffs on 
other goods. This behaviour could serve as a model 
for other countries that – for domestic political 
reasons – want to protect their economy from for-
eign competition using tariffs. Washington’s actions 
could set off a vicious circle of unilateral tariffs and 
other rule-breaking. 
Secondly, the Trump Administration has been 
blocking the WTO’s Appellate Body since June 2017. 
On 10 December 2019 it had to be suspended because 
it was impossible to replace two judges whose terms 
had expired. To this day the Trump Administration 
has refused to state any concrete conditions, such as 
particular changes to the rules, that would persuade 
it to lift its blockade. Instead it has worked to block 
a joint initiative by the European Union, Canada and 
Norway to establish an interim appeal arbitration 
arrangement without US participation. In mid-Novem-
ber 2019, shortly before the adoption of the WTO 
budget for 2020/2021, the Trump Administration 
blocked future financial support for the Appellate 
Body Secretariat to express its dissatisfaction with 
the initiative by Brussels and its partners. Because the 
WTO operates under the consensus principle Washing-
ton was thus able to both prevent necessary appoint-
ments to the Appellate Body and paralyse its Secre-
tariat. 
An incapacitated WTO could come at a significant 
cost for the European Union. A number of recently 
concluded trade agreements with important trading 
partners – among them Japan and the Mercosur 
states – will indeed allow the European Union to 
conduct about 40 percent of its trade in goods under 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements.3 But for more 
than half of its trade, including with the crucial part-
ners United States, China and India, there would – 
at least initially – be no possibility of binding rules-
based dispute resolution as currently exists in the 
WTO framework. 
The United Nations and the US-China 
Conflict 
The rivalry between the United States and China is 
also felt in the United Nations, where it obstructs vital 
decision-making processes. While China has quadru-
pled its contributions to UN organisations over the 
past decade, the United States has been gradually scal-
ing back (not just since the Trump presidency).4 
 
3 The Mercosur states (Mercado Común del Sur) are Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela joined in 
2012, but has been suspended since 2016. 
4 Kristine Lee, “Coming Soon to the United Nations: Chi-
nese Leadership and Authoritarian Values: As Washington 
Steps Back, Beijing Will Take Charge”, Foreign Affairs, 16 Sep-
tember 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/ 
2019-09-16/coming-soon-united-nations-chinese-leadership-
and-authoritarian-values (accessed 10 March 2020). 
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China is the second-largest 
contributor to the United Nations. 
China is today the second-largest individual con-
tributor to the United Nations, both in terms of the 
regular budget and funding for peacekeeping mis-
sions.5 Of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, China provides the most personnel for peace-
keeping missions. Currently Beijing has 2,500 soldiers 
and police deployed, most of them on missions in 
Africa. In 2019 China was in tenth place in the list 
of countries contributing personnel to UN missions.6 
China has recognised the value of the UN as a 
political platform, and makes deft strategic use of 
this. Since 2013 China has assumed a leadership role 
in four of the fifteen specialised agencies of the 
United Nations: the Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organisation (UNIDO), the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) and the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).7 According to 
scholars studying Chinese activities in the United 
Nations, China uses these organisations to influence 
political debates and establish its own political terms 
in official documents, which then flow into the 
general UN discourse on peace and development.8 
China’s activities in the Human Rights Council illus-
trate how it works to sway the UN discourse.9 Since 
 
5 The China Power Project website, “Is China contributing 
to the United Nations’ mission?”, undated, https://chinapower. 
csis.org/china-un-mission/; United Nations Peacekeeping 
website, “How We Are Funded”, undated, https:// 
peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded (accessed 10 
March 2020). 
6 United Nations Peacekeeping website, “Troop and Police 
Contributors”, undated, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/ 
troop-and-police-contributors (accessed 10 March 2020). 
7 China already heads more United Nations specialised 
agencies than any other member state. Its recent attempt 
to lead a fifth, the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) was ended by a US-led diplomatic campaign. Wash-
ington’s preferred candidate, a national of Singapore, was 
elected head of WIPO by a large majority at the beginning 
of March 2020. “U.S.-Backed Candidate for Global Tech Post 
Beats China’s Nominee”, New York Times, 4 March 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/business/economy/un-
world-intellectual-property-organization.html (accessed 
10 March 2020). 
8 Lee, “Coming Soon to the United Nations” (see note 4). 
9 Ted Piccone, China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the 
United Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
September 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
2013 Beijing has repeatedly used the Council as a 
platform for its own propaganda. Chinese represen-
tatives justified the internment of an estimated one 
million members of the Uigur minority in the Xin-
jiang autonomous region as a necessary measure for 
fighting Muslim extremism.10 In verbal and written 
submissions to the Human Rights Council the Chi-
nese government calls into question the value of 
individual human rights and emphasises the signifi-
cance of state-led development programmes and 
the principles of national sovereignty and non-inter-
vention in internal affairs. In July 2019 China’s del-
egates to the Human Rights Council disrupted a 
dialogue with opposition activists from Hong Kong.11 
China also attempted in September 2019 to prevent 
another appearance by opposition activists from 
Hong Kong before the Human Rights Council, where 
they intended to report on violence by security forces 
against demonstrators.12 
The US Administration has not to date responded 
in a decisive way to China’s policy towards the United 
Nations.13 In 2018 the United States withdrew from 
 
uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf 
(accessed 10 March 2020). 
10 Lindsay Maizland, “Is China Undermining Human 
Rights at the United Nations?” Council on Foreign Relations 
website, “In Brief”, 9 July 2019, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ 
china-undermining-human-rights-united-nations (accessed 
10 March 2020). 
11 Ibid. 
12 UNWatch, “Human Rights Council Double Standards: 
Hong Kong Activist Is Only Speaker to Be Rebuked for Ad-
dressing Specific Country Abuses” (Geneva, 17 September 
2019), https://unwatch.org/human-rights-council-double-
standards-hong-kong-activist-is-only-speaker-to-be-rebuked-
for-addressing-specific-country-abuses/ (accessed 10 March 
2020); “Hong Kong Legislator Urges UN Rights Body to Probe 
‘Police Abuse’”, Reuters World News, 16 September 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-un/ 
hong-kong-legislator-urges-un-rights-body-to-probe-police-
abuse-idUSKBN1W116C (accessed 10 March 2020). 
13 While some measures have been taken to improve 
monitoring and respond more assertively to Chinese activ-
ities at the UN, no comprehensive strategy has been advanced. 
Units concerned with China’s behaviour at the United States 
State Department reportedly suffer shortages of funding and 
personnel. See for example: Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon 
Lam, “China already leads 4 of the 15 U.N. specialized agen-
cies — and is aiming for a 5th”, Washington Post, The Monkey 
Cage Blog, 3 March 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2020/03/03/china-already-leads-4-15-un-specialized-
agencies-is-aiming-5th/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 
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the Human Rights Council. In late November 2019 
President Trump signed a bill enabling economic 
sanctions against individuals and the Hong Kong 
government in the event of human rights violations. 
Another bill banned the sale of crowd control soft-
ware by American companies to the Chinese govern-
ment. But the President had little choice, as a two-
thirds majority in Congress would have overturned 
any presidential veto against China-critical legisla-
tion.14 In earlier statements on the protests in Hong 
Kong, Trump had indicated that he regarded the 
treatment of the opposition as an internal matter 
for China. 
In other cases that caused a great stir, Trump has 
reduced America’s financial contributions to the UN. 
One example is Washington’s withdrawal from the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
after almost seventy years of membership. China on 
the other hand increased its contributions to UNRWA 
from about €300,000 annually to more than €2 mil-
lion in 2018.15 In 2019 the Trump Administration 
again threatened repeatedly to make swingeing cuts 
to Washington’s financial contributions to the United 
Nations. Even in cases where US Congress prevented 
budget cuts, the Administration indirectly denies 
funds by declining to actually transfer approved pay-
ments. At the beginning of December 2019 Washing-
ton’s arrears at the UN amounted to more than €950 
million.16 Although Washington eventually trans-
ferred more than half of its outstanding debt, the 
delay by its biggest single contributor forced the UN 
to initiate spending cuts. 
 
14 “Trump Signs Hong Kong Democracy Legislation, Anger-
ing China”, New York Times, 27 November 2019, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/11/27/us/politics/trump-hong-kong.html 
(accessed 10 March 2020). 
15 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), “China Provides US$ 
2.35 Million in Support of UNRWA Food Assistance in Gaza”, 
press release, 21 December 2018, https://www.unrwa.org/ 
newsroom/press-releases/china-provides-us-235-million-
support-unrwa-food-assistance-gaza (accessed 10 March 2020). 
16 Jack Guy and Richard Roth, “UN Warns that Staff Could 
Go Unpaid Next Month as Member States Fail to Pay Dues”, 
CNN, 9 October 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/ 
world/un-budget-crisis-scli-intl/index.html (accessed 10 
March 2020). 
Outlook 
Neither China nor the United States behave consist-
ently and exclusively destructively towards multi-
lateral organisations. But both bypass multilateral 
organisations and rules. Both prioritise bilateral nego-
tiations for resolving pressing conflicts. This harms 
the international organisations, which increasingly 
find themselves outmanoeuvred. The power rivalry 
between the two states is increasingly impinging on 
the interests of the European Union and Germany. 
The EU initiative is therefore on the right track in 
seeking to uphold the WTO’s multilateral dispute 
settlement system jointly with other states. But this is 
not enough. In its own interest the European Union 
must work with other states to support and protect 
the existing multilateral institutions. 
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The walls are closing in on Europe, which risks being 
crushed by the US-China rivalry. On the one hand, 
the EU member states are plainly not on board with 
Trump’s current policy towards China and fear the 
far-reaching consequences of escalating trade disputes 
and geopolitical confrontation in the Pacific. On the 
other, Europe also takes a dimmer view of China, after 
a period where dealings with Beijing concentrated 
almost exclusively on market access and export op-
portunities. In a strategy paper published in March 
2019 the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, adopted a new sharper tone: for the EU 
China is not only an important partner in inter-
national cooperation, but also an economic compe-
titor and systemic rival.1 
China is a test case for 
European self-assertion. 
In Europe, however, unlike the United States, no 
dominant school of thought has emerged treating 
China as the new arch-enemy in a structural global 
conflict. Unlike America’s, the European Union’s 
relationship with China is not focussed on geostra-
tegic containment and decoupling. Instead it wants 
to develop a reciprocal primarily economic/techno-
logical interdependency between Europe and China 
on the basis of reciprocity and jointly agreed prin-
ciples and rules. In order to achieve this, the Euro-
pean Union needs to be united and conflict-capable, 
equipped with the required legitimacy, and acquire 
the necessary industrial/technological resilience. To 
 
1 European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, JOIN(2019) 5 final (Strasbourg, 
12 March 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-
outlook.pdf (accessed 11 December 2019). 
that extent China represents a test case for European 
self-assertiveness. 
European Unity and Disunity over China 
The European Union’s relationship with China is 
characterised by cooperation, competition and con-
flict. It is this ambivalent and issue-driven inter-
regional cooperation in which diverging individual 
interests of market participants and member states 
need to be reconciled with the Union’s overall inter-
ests and legal foundations. As a basic principle, the 
more unified the member states are, the greater the 
Union’s negotiating power and the more effective its 
ability to pursue European interests vis-à-vis Beijing. 
But the member states are not (yet) ready to relin-
quish the corresponding powers or central coordina-
tion in relevant fields of policy towards China to the 
EU level. There are various reasons for this. Europe 
may be the world’s biggest exporter, but is market 
leader in only a handful of digital technologies.2 As it 
increasingly finds itself forced to import strategically 
crucial technologies and resources, certain member 
states react with great sensitivity to this dependency. 
This delays decisions in the Council and weakens 
the European Union’s political impact. Especially in 
human rights question this frequently prevents the 
European Union from formulating a coherent policy 
towards China. Poland and Hungary have taken a 
different line at the United Nations, preventing the 
EU states from presenting a united front. At the EU-
China summit in April 2019 certain member states 
opposed a common EU stance on China because they 
feared that Beijing might respond with economic 
reprisals or other sanctions to perceived affronts such 
as human rights criticisms. In March 2019 Italy 
 
2 “Softly, Softly: The Europeans Want Their Own Vision 
Fund to Invest in Tech”, Economist, 31 August 2019. 
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became the first G7 state to sign on to China’s “New 
Silk Road” (the Belt and Road Initiative). In so doing, 
Rome subverted the wish of the other member states 
to conduct talks about participating in the BRI only as 
a European block. 
Disunity towards China – and 
the United States. 
Disunity weighs all the heavier where the EU states 
also fail to pull together vis-à-vis the United States, 
which Washington is quick to exploit. Poland for ex-
ample has signed bilateral treaties with the United 
States on missile defence and promised Washington 
that it will exclude Chinese technology from its 5G 
network.3 Such specific commitments are hard to 
reconcile with a united front of all member states. 
The European Union naturally shares a very broad 
range economic, security and normative interests 
with the United States while the distance to China 
remains fundamental. But a European policy towards 
China cannot build on the transatlantic relationship 
as it could in the past. It now exists within a new sys-
tem of coordinates determined principally by the axis 
of conflict between the United States and China, and 
in which the European Union must find and hold its 
own position. 
Foreign and Security Policy 
The European Union is not a fully-fledged foreign 
policy and security actor in the Asia-Pacific region, 
but all the member states have external economic 
interests there, which would certainly have to be 
defended in the event of crisis. France and the United 
Kingdom in particular maintain their own naval pres-
ence in East Asia, relying on ties dating back to their 
time as colonial powers.4 The South China Sea is an 
important transit route for international movements 
of goods and raw materials, so a military conflict 
 
3 “US-Regierung genehmigt Milliardendeal mit Polen”, 
Die Zeit, 18 December 2017, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ 
ausland/2017-11/nato-polen-raketenabwehr-usa-auftrag-
konflikt-russland (accessed 11 December 2019); “Polen 
geht bei 5G Sonderweg mit den USA”, Deutsche Wirtschafts-
nachrichten, 3 September 2019, https://deutsche-wirtschafts-
nachrichten.de/500078/Polen-geht-bei-5G-Sonderweg-mit-
den-USA (accessed 11 December 2019). 
4 Björn Müller, “Europäische Flugzeugträger im Pazifik”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 January 2019. 
there would have massive repercussions on the Euro-
pean Union’s economic and security interests. France 
and the United Kingdom have already announced 
their intention to expand their security presence in 
the Far East. They assist states bordering the South 
China Sea in modernising their armed forces with 
technology transfer and arms sales, offer to support 
their efforts to secure free access to the seas through 
an expanded naval presence, and provide assistance 
with disaster relief, cyber-defence and counter-terror-
ism.5 Paris and London see themselves as “custodians 
of Western and European interests in the region”.6 
The French would like to see Europe taking on some 
of their commitments in the region, for example 
through EU flotillas including the United Kingdom.7 
From 2020 it is planned to send a German naval 
officer to the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion 
Centre. 
Security and economic concerns are becoming ever 
more closely interconnected. A prime example of this 
is the modernisation of mobile phone networks using 
components from the Chinese technology firm Hua-
wei. In connection with European infrastructures, 
Huawei is not per se excluded from the single market. 
The question of the reliability of telecommunication 
components is subsumed under the logic of market 
regulation. Under the new EU Toolbox for 5G Security 
and the EU Cybersecurity Act all providers and sup-
pliers of information and communication technology 
will be subject to graduated controls and will have to 
fulfil strict certification criteria for hardware and soft-
ware. All the major internet platforms – whether 
American or Chinese – potentially enable surveil-
lance capitalism (Shoshana Zuboff), so they are all of 
interest to EU data protection, data security and com-
petition law.8 
If a data leakage by Huawei were to be identified 
or cases of cybersabotage against digital infrastruc-
tures occurred, the consequence would be the com-
pany’s exclusion from the Single Market. That in turn 
would decisively accelerate the European Union’s 
efforts to achieve digital sovereignty vis-à-vis China. 
In the NATO context the European Union and the 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. (translated). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Mathias Döpfner, “‘Das Worst-Case-Szenario ist bereits 
da’: Die Harvard-Ökonomin Shoshana Zuboff war eine der 
Ersten, die vor der Übermacht der großen Digitalkonzerne 
warnte – und vor deren Datenhunger”, Welt am Sonntag, 
17 December 2019, 19–22. 
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United States share an interest in protecting critical 
infrastructures and defending them against attack. 
An incident could set in motion a race where both 
the West and the Chinese attempt to exclude all pos-
sible social and technical vulnerabilities. The threat-
ened consequence is a military arms race and massive 
economic losses. 
The European Union as Trade and 
Regulatory Power 
The European Union’s position in international 
politics rests to a great extent on its strength as a 
trade and regulatory power, as even China must ac-
knowledge. The economic is the dominant factor in 
the increasingly conflictual Euro-Chinese relation-
ship. In many respects the European Union shares 
Washington’s criticisms of unfair Chinese competi-
tion practices. But Brussels and Washington have 
their own disagreements about trade questions and 
WTO principles, which in turn makes it harder to 
hold a shared transatlantic line towards Beijing. 
Trade: The European Union is China’s largest trade 
partner, while China is the European Union’s second-
largest trade partner after the United States. Since 
1975 trade between China and the European Union 
has expanded by a factor of 250, to reach a volume of 
$680 billion in 2018.9 Within the European Union the 
most competitive and largest exporters are the drivers 
of China policy. The European Union suffers both 
directly and indirectly from Washington’s policy of 
punitive tariffs towards China: directly in the case 
of aluminium and steel, indirectly where trade flows 
are diverted (for example soybeans). After the United 
States imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium the 
European Union was forced to introduce import 
quotas for steel products from third countries – to 
the chagrin of the European car industry, which is 
reliant on imported steel. And in July 2018 US Presi-
dent Trump and then EU Commission President 
Juncker agreed that the European Union would rather 
support America’s trade interests than those of Brazil, 
traditionally the European Union’s largest supplier 
of soybeans, as a concession to Washington. The 
Euro-American trade disputes threaten to obscure the 
shared interest in multilateral solutions in the trans-
atlantic relationship. And this makes it impossible to 
 
9 Eurostat data. 
use the WTO mechanisms to effectively enforce free 
trade principles – such as intellectual property pro-
tections and reciprocity of market access and invest-
ment terms – vis-à-vis Beijing. Especially in EU coun-
tries like Germany and France, which have important 
economic relations with China, companies and organi-
sations call for a strong and assertive stance against 
Beijing’s unfair practices.10 The European Union 
accuses Beijing of systematically subsidising Chinese 
private and state-owned enterprises in order to give 
them competitive advantages on a global scale. In 
response, especially France and Germany are in favour 
of the European Union developing an industrial strat-
egy dedicated to catching up in digitalisation and 
infrastructure modernisation, to strengthen the com-
petitiveness and market position of Europe’s small 
and medium-sized enterprises which form the back-
bone of the (digital) internal market and the Euro-
pean economic model. At the same time Brussels 
should reform competition law in relation to market-
relevant national and European enterprises, such 
as to promote a strategic sustainability agenda for 
climate and environmental technologies. This should 
also make the conditions of competition for these 
firms fairer in comparison to the often partly state-
directed corporations in China. 
Investment: The European Union has recently reformed 
its foreign investment control regime with an eye to 
Chinese activities in the single market. Following 
the example of the US legislation, it strengthens the 
state’s rights to intervene vis-à-vis market partici-
pants. Here Brussels has succeeded in bridging the 
different preferences of the member states to adopt 
a regulation to which even countries like Portugal, 
Greece and Hungary were able to agree.11 The latter 
had feared disadvantages if the new rules for foreign 
investment screening had been too strict. Here the 
European Union specifically has China in its sights as 
an economic competitor, because China is seeking to 
 
10 Axel Dorloff, “EU-China-Gipfel: Auf der Suche nach 
Gemeinsamkeiten”, tagesschau.de, 9 April 2019, https://www. 
tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/eu-china-gipfel-113.html (accessed 
11 December 2019). 
11 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework 
for Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the European Union, 
SWD(2017) 297 final, Brussels, 13 September 2017, COM(2017) 
487 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar: 
cf655d2a-9858-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1& 
format=PDF (accessed 11 December 2019). 
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buy its way strategically into segments of the Euro-
pean Union’s high-tech research and manufacturing, 
such as artificial intelligence, robotics and biotech-
nology. The new EU regulation is a compromise. 
It provides for creating a binding legal framework 
within which the member states conduct their own 
foreign investment screening before making the final 
decision themselves. The common criteria cover secu-
rity and public order but leave aside broader economic 
issues such as those relating to competition law or 
industrial policy. The unity of the EU states in rela-
tion to investment controls contrasts with differences 
over regulatory preferences of the kind that exist 
between France and Germany. Specifically it is evi-
dent that there is no consensus among the EU states 
concerning Huawei’s wish to participate in the crea-
tion of 5G infrastructure in the European market. 
Those that would not exclude participation stand 
opposed to the Trump Administration, which regards 
Huawei as a Trojan horse sent by a hostile govern-
ment whose policies are irreconcilable with US secu-
rity interests. Here Washington’s clear geostrategic 
perspective collides with the European Union’s pri-
marily economic one. However, for reasons of secu-
rity or vulnerability of critical infrastructure, the 
United Kingdom and Germany have also defined 
strict security criteria for suppliers. France already 
applies more restrictive security tests on foreign 
suppliers. The European Commission has published 
its own 5G Toolbox consisting of clearly defined 
recommendations for security and reliability 
standards. 
Supranational geopolitics builds on 
the EU’s resources as a trade and 
regulatory power. 
Regulation in the Digital Single Market: The European 
Union’s efforts to define and implement rules for the 
Digital Single Market meet their limits in relation to 
China and to an extent also the United States. The 
growing mistrust between America and Europe is 
reflected, for example, in Trump’s response to the 
repeated fines imposed by the European Commission 
on US-based Google for violations of European com-
petition law. The US President sees this as an act of 
retribution by a “tax lady [who] hates the US”, as he 
called EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager.12 It is indeed the case that the regulatory 
philosophies on both sides of the Atlantic are becom-
ing ever harder to reconcile. In the Treaty on the 
European Union the member states commit to a 
competitive social market economy (Article 3, TEU) 
and democracy (Article 2, TEU) and emphasises the 
universal rights of the individual (also concerning 
their personal data). The European Union integrates 
various stakeholders and market participants in 
its processes, in which fundamental rights are also 
observed. This multi-stakeholder approach is also 
found in current position papers by European insti-
tutions on the opportunities and challenges of the 
(Digital) Single Market and its agenda. EU organs com-
mit to the idea of a (digital) society that is democratic 
and both community-based and inclusive. From this, 
the European Union defines interests, preferences 
and also instruments for a regulatory policy towards 
China and the United States. This policy is expressed 
through the General Data Protection Regulation, 
through merger controls and through restrictions on 
the generous tax policies of individual member states 
such as Ireland towards US-based Apple. If the Euro-
pean Union cannot succeed in working with the other 
major powers including China to establish permanent 
security- and confidence-building measures for cyber-
security and Industry 4.0, there is threat of a global 
collapse of the digital commons. Cooperation is also 
a precondition for tackling global challenges such as 
securing social peace and justice under the (working) 
conditions of digitalisation. Prosperity and stability 
on the regional and global scale depend decisively on 
observance of shared minimum standards in IT secu-
rity as well as norms for state action in cyberspace 
and for the creation of shared governance structure. 
Supranational Geopolitics 
What makes the European Union strong in dealings 
with China and other great powers is the democratic 
disposition of its member states, its supranational 
institutional order and autonomous legal order, the 
size and potential of the Single Market, the common 
currency area, and the common trade and competi-
tion policy. These factors offer immense potential; to 
 
12 David M. Herszenhorn, “Typhoon Trump Blows G7 
Off Course”, Politico, 10 June 2018, https://www.politico.eu/ 
article/typhoon-trump-blows-g7-off-course/ (accessed 7 Janu-
ary 2020). 
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make full use of it demands the following: Firstly, the 
European Union’s policy towards China is most effec-
tive where it is conceived not as a purely country-
based strategy but embedded in a comprehensive and 
overall strategy for the European Union’s self-asser-
tiveness. Secondly, under the conditions of a new 
great power rivalry the European Union can best 
assert itself by further supranational integration and 
strengthening its collective actorness. Supranational 
geopolitics starts from the resources the European 
Union possesses as a trade and regulatory power. This 
represents the central source of its negotiating power 
on a global scale. Logically then, topics like industrial 
policy, market access and data security are high on 
the agenda of the new “geopolitical Commission” 
(Ursula von der Leyen).13 It would also be important 
for the new multi-annual financial framework to re-
flect these priorities and for the European Union to 
strengthen the Eurozone and the logic of integration 
in foreign and security policy. 
As the world’s largest internal market, the Euro-
pean Union has every reason to encounter China with 
confidence and to join neither the US strategy of 
containment nor that of the decoupling of entire eco-
nomic spaces. Cooperation and competition are legiti-
mate modes for a policy of self-assertion, as is self-
protection through a modern industrial policy designed 
to close the technology gap. It plays into the Europe-
an Union’s hands that China operates above all in the 
geo-economic arena, which is also where Europe’s 
power resources lie. Standing up to Beijing over WTO 
rules while at the same time engaging in the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRI projects are 
important elements of a strategic interdependency 
with China. At the same time Europe’s self-assertive-
ness could be boosted by the EU-Asia Connectivity 
Strategy: strategic interdependence – rather than 
decoupling – is the more promising approach to 
dealing with China. This also includes the European 
Union offering third states alternatives to Chinese 
direct investment, through cooperation that will need 
to be lucrative for the recipients. The European Union 
has always seen Asia as more than just China. The 
European Union should therefore put more diplomatic 
and political weight into its cooperation and free 
 
13 European Commission, Vertretung in Deutschland, 
“Kommission von der Leyen: Eine Union, die mehr erreichen 
will”, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/ 
20190910-team-struktur-von-der-leyen-kommission_de (ac-
cessed 11 December 2019). 
trade agreements with Japan, India and ASEAN and 
its member states. Its collective Asia diplomacy needs 
to be expanded above all in the fields of rule of law, 
democracy and human rights, ideally – as in other 
questions – together with the United States. In order 
to be able to stand up to China in the long term the 
European Union will have to strengthen its capabili-
ties for supranational geopolitics, again ideally with 
transatlantic coordination and backing. The German 
government, together with France, the Commission 
and the Eurozone states, should explore the possi-
bilities of a transatlantic trade agreement to remove 
industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers in order to 
reinforce the Union’s bargaining power towards Bei-
jing in the light of upcoming negotiations about an 
investment protection agreement. The next EU-China 
summit is scheduled for the second half of 2020, 
during the German EU presidency, and should be sup-
plemented by a parliamentary component. Independ-
ently of the concrete agenda, the most important mes-
sage to China would be that the EU member states 
stand firmly united behind their priorities, above all 
principle-based policies and reciprocity on all levels 
and in all policy areas. 
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Abbreviations 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CGTN China Global Television Network 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States) 
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (United 
Nations) 
5G Fifth Generation (standard for mobile 
telephony and internet) 
G20 Group of Twenty major industrialised nations 
and emerging economies 
G7 Group of Seven (leading Western industrial 
nations) 
HGV Hypersonic glide vehicle 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IFC Information Fusion Centre (Singapore Navy) 
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
IP Internet protocol 
IT Information Technology 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
PIIE Peterson Institute for International Economics 
(Washington, D. C.) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
UN United Nations 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (Vienna) 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
VPN Virtual private network 
WTO World Trade Organisation (Geneva) 
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